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I. INTRODUCTION
Corporations sometimes tread a fine line between adequate and
inadequate disclosure under the securities laws by disclosing the data
necessary to calculate the bottom line impact of a particular set of facts, but
failing to disclose the bottom line itself. For example, in one particular case,
Merck & Co., Inc. ("Merck") disclosed that one of its subsidiaries, Medco
Health Solutions, Inc. ("Medco"), had recognized co-payments it never
actually received as revenue.1 Merck failed, however, to disclose the total
amount of the revenue so recognized-which turned out to be $5.54 billion
for the year 2001.2 When plaintiffs sued, claiming that recognition of this
never-received revenue constituted fraud, the Third Circuit granted Merck's
motion to dismiss on the ground that the revenue recognition practice was
immaterial as demonstrated by the market's failure to react to disclosure of
the practice.3  As for the argument that the disclosure of the revenue
recognition practice was materially deficient for failing to disclose the total
amount of revenue recognized thereunder, the court held the omission of the
bottom line to be immaterial as well, since the data necessary to calculate the
amount had been disclosed.4 The court noted, however, that "Merck was
clearly treading a fine line with this delayed, piecemeal disclosure." 5
When plaintiffs challenge such incomplete disclosure as fraudulent,
courts routinely dismiss their claims based upon application of what, for the
purposes of this paper, I will call the "Simple Math" rule. Under the Simple
Math rule, courts "decline to hold that those responsible for the preparation
of [disclosures] must assume that stockholders cannot perform simple
[math]." 6 In other words, failure to disclose the bottom line is immaterial as
a matter of law where the data necessary to calculate the bottom line has
been disclosed. The Third Circuit relied on the Simple Math rule in Merck's
case, even though Merck also failed to disclose one of the necessary pieces
of data to allow for calculation of the bottom line.7 The Third Circuit
concluded that since the missing piece of data could readily be surmised by
making one simple assumption, the case did not differ significantly from
other cases that have concluded that requiring investors to perform
mathematical calculations to determine the impact of certain facts did not
amount to securities fraud.' The court left open, however, the question of
1. In re Merck & Co., Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261, 264 (3d Cir. 2005).
2. Id. at 264-65.
3. Id. at 269-70.
4. Id. at 270. The court framed the issue as "whether needing [a certain] amount of
mathematical proficiency to make sense of the disclosure negates the disclosure itself." Id.
5. Id. at 271.
6. Ash v. LFE Corp., 525 F.2d 215, 219 (3d Cir. 1975).
7. Merck, 432 F.3d at 270.
8. Id.
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"how many mathematical calculations are too many or how strained
assumptions must be" before such piecemeal disclosure constitutes fraud.'
In this paper I address the question left open by the Third Circuit in In re
Merck & Co., Securities Litigation. I argue that the current disclosure
regime's express purpose of ensuring full and fair disclosure cautions
against courts being too quick to dismiss claims based upon a failure to
disclose the bottom line. Rather, courts should apply what I call, for
purposes of this paper, the "Reasonably Available Data" rule.' °  The
Reasonably Available Data rule builds upon existing materiality doctrines to
analyze each particular omission on its own facts.'1 Specifically, I argue
that when courts are presented with the question of whether failure to
explicitly disclose the bottom line constitutes a material omission, they
should ask: (1) whether all the relevant pieces of data necessary to calculate
the bottom line were disclosed proximately to one another and in the place
where a reasonable investor would expect to find them; (2) whether the data
was cross-referenced to; and (3) whether the import of the data was
sufficiently highlighted to alert the reasonable investor.' 2 In addition, where
the bottom line was omitted in a corrective disclosure, that fact should count
against defendants. 13  Finally, a presumption of materiality should be
applied where the bottom line is subsequently made public and the market
reacts negatively to that disclosure. 14
This approach is consistent with the Supreme Court's admonition
against the use of bright-line rules in the context of materiality
determinations:
A bright-line rule indeed is easier to follow than a standard that
requires the exercise of judgment in the light of all the
circumstances. But ease of application alone is not an excuse for
ignoring the purposes of the Securities Acts and Congress' policy
decisions. Any approach that designates a single fact or occurrence
as always determinative of an inherently fact-specific finding such
as materiality, must necessarily be overinclusive or
underinclusive.' 5
9. Id. at 271.
10. See infra notes 122-30 and accompanying text.
11. See infra pp. 962-64.
12. See infra pp. 963-64.
13. See infra p. 9 64 .
14. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
15. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988); see also Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228
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It is my contention that the bright-line Simple Math rule, which
designates the single fact of calculability as determinative of immateriality,
creates exactly the type of underinclusive results the Supreme Court warned
of. Furthermore, the proposed approach makes sense from a policy
standpoint because it continues to serve the safety valve function of the
Simple Math rule by allowing courts to dismiss frivolous claims, while
avoiding the watering down of a materiality standard that is so integral to
our modem disclosure regime.
Following this Introduction, Part II will provide relevant background
and discuss the elements of Rule lOb-5,16 which is the anti-fraud provision
most often relied on by investors.'7  This section will also include a
discussion of the relevant factors important under various materiality
doctrines, such as the "hidden facts" doctrine and the "bespeaks caution"
doctrine.' 8 Part III will provide a more detailed explanation of why there is
a problem with courts applying a general rule that failure to do calculations
for investors does not constitute a material omission as a matter of law, and
presents the Reasonably Available Data rule as a possible solution.' 9 Part
IV then applies the Reasonably Available Data rule to relevant case law,
demonstrating that the rule produces results more in line with the Supreme
Court's definition of materiality, and better serves the goals of our current
regulatory regime, than the Simple Math rule. 20  Finally, Part V provides
concluding remarks. 2
F.3d 154, 162 (2d Cir. 2000) ("Following Basic, we have consistently rejected a formulaic approach
to assessing the materiality of an alleged misrepresentation.").
16. A number of the cases discussed in this paper arose under Rule 14a-9, which prohibits
material misstatements and omissions in connection with the solicitation of proxies. See 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-9 (2006). However, since this paper is focused on the issue of materiality, this distinction is
of little import since "[tihe concept of materiality under the proxy rules is much the same as under
the securities laws generally." THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 371
(5th ed. 2005). This is not to say, however, that one could not argue that some factual distinction
between the solicitation of proxies and the sale of securities warrants some type of modification of
the proposed Reasonably Available Data rule in the relevant context. Such fine-tuning of the
Reasonably Available Data rule, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
17. See infra notes 22-105 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 22-105 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 106-30 and accompanying text. It is not difficult to foresee continued
problems with corporations failing to disclose the bottom line. See David Reilly, Restatements Still
Bedevil Firms, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2007, at C7 ("Publicly traded companies filed 1,876
restatements of financial results in 2006, setting a record for corrections of financial statements
while showing that many still are struggling to get the accounting right for both simple and complex
transactions."); David Reilly, No More 'Stealth Restating', WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2006, at Cl ("In
recent years, scores of companies have changed previously reported figures via what critics call
'stealth restatements,' commonly including the new, different figures in subsequent securities filings.
The SEC's stand: Such changes constitute information that is material to investors and thus needs to
be formally disclosed in a restatement filing clearly labeled as such.").
20. See infra notes 131-278 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 279-80 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND
"The starting point in analyzing any question of federal securities law is
of course the statutes. 22 The two main statutes making up federal securities
law are the Securities Act of 193323 ("the Securities Act" or "the '33 Act")
and the Securities Exchange Act of 193424 ("the Exchange Act" or "the '34
Act," and, together with the '33 Act, "the Acts"). The Securities Act focuses
on the registration and distribution of securities. 25 Meanwhile, the Exchange
Act sets forth, among other things, the on-going and periodic reporting
requirements of issuers registered under the '34 Act. 26  Meanwhile, the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), the regulatory body that
administers the Acts, issues various rules to give further effect to the
statutory provisions of the Acts.27 Finally, judicial opinions round out the
primary sources of securities law.28
The broad goal of securities regulation in the United States is to ensure
full and fair disclosure:
Underlying the adoption of extensive disclosure requirements was a
legislative philosophy: "There cannot be honest markets without
honest publicity. Manipulation and dishonest practices of the
market place thrive upon mystery and secrecy." H. R. Rep. No.
1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 11 (1934). Th[e Supreme] Court
"repeatedly has described the 'fundamental purpose' of the
[Exchange] Act as implementing a 'philosophy of full disclosure."'
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-478 (1977),
quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180,
186 (1963).29
Full and fair disclosure is essential to the integrity of the securities
markets, 30 and Rule 1Ob-5, the general antifraud provision promulgated by
22. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 3.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2000).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2000).
25. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 29-30.
26. Id. at 30-31.
27. Id. at 32.
28. Id. at 3 n.31 ("[T]he essence of most securities litigation is grounded upon SEC Rule I Ob-5,
which is very brief and sketchy. Thus, it is fair to say that the vast body of case law under this
section is a type of de facto federal common law of securities fraud.").
29. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1987).
30. See id. at 234-35 n.12 ("The importance of accurate and complete issuer disclosure to the
integrity of the securities markets cannot be overemphasized. To the extent that investors cannot
rely upon the accuracy and completeness of issuer statements, they will be less likely to invest,
the SEC pursuant to § 10 of the Exchange Act, is an essential component of
this disclosure regime.3
In relevant part, Rule 1 Ob-5 makes it unlawful for anyone, in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security, "to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. 32  The
elements of Rule lOb-5 include: (1) a false material representation, or
omission of a material fact necessary in order to make a statement made not
misleading;33 (2) made or omitted with scienter; (3) that is relied upon and
causes loss. 3 4  Because the Simple Math rule states that failure to disclose
the bottom line is immaterial as a matter of law where the data necessary to
calculate that bottom line is disclosed, the element of particular relevance to
our discussion here is materiality. However, I will also address some of the
other elements because there is often a significant blending of factors in the
reported cases.
Before continuing on to the discussion of the relevant elements of Rule
1 Ob-5, however, it is worth quickly reviewing some other liability provisions
under the Acts that contain a materiality element, since the discussion here
regarding materiality should apply equally under these other sections. These
provisions include: Section 11 (a) of the Securities Act,35 which "creates an
express right of action for damages by securities purchasers when a
registration statement contains untrue statements of material fact or
omissions of material fact; ' 36  Section 12(a)(2) of the '33 Act, 37 which
thereby reducing the liquidity of the securities markets to the detriment of investors and issuers
alike." (quoting In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22214 (1985))).
31. Basic, 485 U.S. at 231 ("[A] private cause of action exists for a violation of§ 10(b) and Rule
1Ob-5, and constitutes an essential tool for enforcement of the 1934 Act's requirements.").
32. 17C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006).
33. This paper argues; in effect, for an affirmative duty to disclose the bottom line impact, where
material, of otherwise disclosed facts. See In re Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 267 (2d
Cir. 1993) ("[A]n omission is actionable under the securities laws only when the corporation is
subject to a duty to disclose the omitted facts."). One basis for explicitly recognizing such a duty is
that a statement disclosing a particular fact without disclosing the relevant impact creates the
impression that the consequences of that fact are insignificant. On its face, recognizing such a duty
is not a startling proposition. See Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 777 (2d Cir. 1991)
("That inside directors stand to gain from a recommended transaction is material information that
must be disclosed to shareholders considering a tender offer. Moreover, we may assume for
purposes of our decision that there is a reasonable likelihood that the magnitude of such a gain
would be considered important by the reasonable investor in deciding how to act and is thus also
material information.") (internal citation omitted). It is a particularly non-controversial proposition
in light of the fact that I do not challenge the current judicial approach to the extent it allows
companies to satisfy this duty by providing investors with sufficient data to calculate the magnitude
themselves. Rather, I argue simply that a more rigorous analysis needs to be applied in these cases
in order to ensure that the principle of full and fair disclosure is upheld.
34. Starr v. Georgeson S'holder, Inc., 412 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 2005).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000).
36. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 284.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2)(2000).
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"creates an express private remedy for material misstatements or omissions
in connection with the sale or offer for sale of a security; 3  Section 17(a),39
which "prohibits fraud, material misstatements, and omissions of fact in
connection with the sale of securities; ' 40 Rule 14a-9,4 1 which "prohibits
material misstatements and omissions in connection with the solicitation of
proxies; '42 and, Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act,43 which "prohibits
material misstatements, omissions, and fraudulent practices in connection
with tender offers." 44  There are obviously many meaningful differences
among these provisions. For example, not all of them require a showing of
reliance or scienter, or support a private cause of action.45 However,
materiality is generally analyzed similarly under all these provisions.46 It is
to this particular element that we turn next.
A. Materiality
The Supreme Court defined materiality for purposes of securities
regulation in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, InC.47  There, the Court
stated that "[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable [investor] would consider it important in deciding [whether
to buy or sell]."4 8 However, "it is not necessary to show that the investor
38. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 302.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 7 7q (2000).
40. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 308.
41. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2006).
42. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 368.
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2000).
44. HAZEN, supra note 16, at412.
45. See, e.g., id. at 303 ("[S]ection 12(a)(2) liability does not require scienter."); id. at 304 ("[l~t
is not necessary for plaintiff to establish reliance in a section 12(a)(2) action."); id. at 309 ("The
overwhelming majority of recent decisions have not been at all receptive to the private right of
action [under section 17(a)]."); id. at 370 ("[S]cienter is not required to establish a violation of Rule
14a-9's prohibitions against material misstatements and omissions in connection with a proxy
solicitation.").
46. See id. at 284 n.3 ("Normal concepts of materiality apply in section 11 actions.... Thus, for
example, the bespeaks caution doctrine ... is applicable .... ); id. at 302 n.2 ("[M]ateriality is the
same under sections II and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act."); id. at 413 ("Materiality issues under the
Williams Act are to be decided in much the same way as under the other disclosure provisions of the
securities laws.").
47. 426 U.S. 438 (1976). TSC Industries involved a proxy statement claim brought under Rule
14a-9, but the TSC standard for materiality has been adopted in Rule lOb-5 cases as well. See Basic,
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (adopting the standard in TSC Industries for Rule lOb-5
actions); see also Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970) (stating that materiality
"embodies a conclusion that the defect was of such a character that it might have been considered
important by a reasonable shareholder who was in the process of deciding how to vote").
48. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449.
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would have acted differently., 49  The Court also defined materiality as
involving an evaluation of whether there was "a substantial likelihood that
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made
available."50
"The 'total mix' of information includes all information 'reasonably
available to the shareholders,' including 'data sent to shareholders by a
company."' 51 In order for information to be "reasonably available" so as to
make up part of the total mix of information available to a reasonable
investor, courts sometimes require some type of cross-reference from the
document to which an investor can be expected to look, to the source of any
document a defendant is relying on in arguing all necessary information was
disclosed.52 Also, under the total mix of information analysis, public
availability of the truth may offset a misleading disclosure.53 However, "not
every mixture with the true will neutralize the deceptive. If it would take a
financial analyst to spot the tension between the one and the other, whatever
is misleading will remain materially so, and liability should follow. ' 54  In
line with this reasoning, a defendant cannot rebut a charge of having omitted
a necessary material fact by pointing to facts that, while disclosed and
49. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 487; see also TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449 ("[Materiality] does not
require proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted fact would have caused the
reasonable investor to change his vote.").
50. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449.
51. Starr v. Georgeson S'holder, Inc., 412 F.3d 103, 110 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Press v. Quick
& Reilly, Inc., 218 F.3d 121, 130 (2d Cir. 2000)).
52. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Int'l Paper Co., 985 F.2d 1190, 1199-1200 (2d Cir.
1993) ("Nor was the Company's IO-K Report part of the reasonably available mix. That report was
filed with the SEC, not distributed to shareholders. Nothing in any of the documents sent to
shareholders highlighted the 10-K Report. The Proxy Statement did not mention it at all; and the
annual report made no reference to it in its description of the Company's environmental record.
Indeed, in each link of the chain of references on which the Company now relies the pertinent
reference was a general one widely separated from any environmental discussion. Thus, the Proxy
Statement's mention of the annual report appeared only as a general reference on page 2 of the
Proxy Statement; the annual report's reference to the availability of the 10-K Report appeared only
as an unenlightening statement on the inside of the annual report's back cover[.]"); Marksman
Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1307 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (concluding that a
reasonable investor could have been misled even though the relevant facts were disclosed in an
agreement attached to an annual report where "nothing in the body of the Form 10-K discussed the
marketing agreement, explained the significance of its terms, or disclosed that revenues were being
recognized while Stanson had a right of return or before Stanson was actually obligated to make
payment").
53. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1097 (1991) ("[P]ublishing accurate
facts in a proxy statement can render a misleading proposition too unimportant to ground liability.").
54. Id. at 1097-98 ("The point of a proxy statement, after all, should be to inform, not to
challenge the reader's critical wits. Only when the inconsistency would exhaust the misleading
conclusion's capacity to influence the reasonable shareholder would a § 14(a) action fail on the
element of materiality.").
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technically sufficient to alert the investor to the truth, are so buried or hidden
within the relevant document as to be practically non-disclosed.55
Under the "buried facts" doctrine, a disclosure is deemed
inadequate if it is presented in a way that conceals or obscures the
information sought to be disclosed. The doctrine applies when the
fact in question is hidden in a voluminous document or is disclosed
in a piecemeal fashion which prevents a reasonable shareholder
from realizing the "correlation and overall import of the various
facts interspersed throughout" the document.
5 6
Furthermore, under the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, the presence of
meaningful cautionary language can preclude a finding that investors were
misled by projections or other forward-looking statements. 7 However, the
cautionary language must "accompany" the disclosure sought to be
immunized. 58 In other words, to the extent defendants are relying on one
part of a document to immunize another part, proximity matters. 59 Also, the
"puffery" defense precludes a finding of materiality where liability is sought
to be imposed for "generalized positive statements about a company's
progress." 60 This is based on the assumption that people expect a certain
amount of salesmanship in connection with, for example, statements made
by management about their business. However, like most general rules of
thumb, puffery has its limits. For example, "[m]isrepresentation by
implying the existence of certain facts cannot be disguised as mere
55. See United Paperworkers, 985 F.2d at 1199 ("[Elven information actually sent to
shareholders need not be considered part of the total mix reasonably available to them if 'the true' is
'buried' in unrelated discussions.") (internal citation omitted).
56. Werner v. Werner, 267 F.3d 288, 297 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Kas v. Fin. Gen. Bankshares,
Inc., 796 F.2d 508, 516 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
57. See In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 371 (3d Cir. 1993) ("[W]hen an
offering document's forecasts, opinions or projections are accompanied by meaningful cautionary
statements, the forward-looking statements will not form the basis for a securities fraud claim if
those statements did not affect the 'total mix' of information the document provided investors. In
other words, cautionary language, if sufficient, renders the alleged omissions or misrepresentations
immaterial as a matter of law.").
58. The "bespeaks caution" doctrine was codified in § 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 as part of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-5(c)
(2002) (setting forth the requirement that the forward-looking statement be "accompanied by
meaningful cautionary statements" in order to receive the protections of the safe harbor under one of
its sub-divisions); see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-2 (codifying parallel provision under the Securities
Act of 1933).
59. See generally In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1414 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he
'bespeaks caution' doctrine reflects the unremarkable proposition that statements must be analyzed
in context.").
60. Nathenson v. Zonagen, Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 419 (5th Cir. 2001).
puffing., 61  Finally, the magnitude of the impact of a particular occurrence
plays a role in materiality determinations even outside Simple Math cases.
In the context of contingent events, whether a particular disclosure is
material depends upon a balancing of the probability of the event's
occurrence and the magnitude of its impact assuming occurrence.62
Particularly relevant to our discussion here, magnitude may be material as an
independent fact.63
Courts also will often look to market reaction to assist them in making
their materiality determination. 64 For example, in Merck the Third Circuit
relied on the proposition that "the materiality of disclosed information may
be measured post hoc by looking to the movement, in the period
immediately following disclosure, of the price of the firm's stock. 65  While
market reaction clearly is strong evidence of materiality, to equate market
reaction with materiality is not without its problems. For example, there are
difficulties in "isolating the reaction to the particular information as opposed
to reaction to other information including broader economic, market or
industry factors." 66 Furthermore, as will be discussed in more detail below,
equating lack of price movement with immateriality raises further
61. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 490 ("Similarly, use of percentages may imply a factual basis and
if so, cannot be protected as mere puffing.").
62. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988).
63. See Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 777 (2d Cir. 1991) ("That inside directors
stand to gain from a recommended transaction is material information that must be disclosed to
shareholders considering a tender offer. Moreover, we may assume for purposes of our decision that
there is reasonable likelihood that the magnitude of such a gain would be considered important by
the reasonable investor in deciding how to act and is thus also material information.") (internal
citation omitted).
64. But see No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust v. Am. W. Holding Corp.,
320 F.3d 920, 934 (9th Cir. 2003) ("In Basic, the Supreme Court expressly adopted the 'reasonable
investor' standard set forth in TSC Industries for determining materiality in the Section 10(b) and
Rule lob-5 context .... Pursuant to Basic, we reject Defendants' argument for adoption of a bright-
line rule requiring an immediate market reaction [to show materiality]. The market is subject to
distortions that prevent the ideal of 'a free and open public market' from occurring. As recognized
by the Supreme Court, these distortions may not be corrected immediately. Because of these
distortions, adoption of a bright-line rule assuming that the stock price will instantly react would fail
to address the realities of the market. Thus, we decline to adopt a bright-line rule, and, instead,
engage in the 'fact-specific inquiry' set forth in Basic.") (internal citations omitted).
65. In re Merck & Co., Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261, 269 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Oran v. Stafford,
226 F.3d 275, 282 (3d Cir. 2000)).
66. 3 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES
FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD, § 6:166 (2d ed. 2001) ("It seems to follow that actual market
reaction to information after it is released is powerful evidence as to whether the information is
material. However, there are some difficulties with this kind of evidence. One set includes the time
period over which the reaction is to be measured (minutes, hours or days), what is to be measured
(e.g., price or volume), and what measure of change indicates materiality (5%, 10%, 20%, etc).
Another difficulty is isolating the reaction to the particular information as opposed to reaction to
other information including broader economic, market or industry factors. Yet another is the degree
to which market reaction has been diminished by the insider trading itself, which tends to move the
market in the direction it will take when the information is widely known.").
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questions-particularly where that argument is made on a motion to dismiss
or motion for summary judgment.6 7
For all these reasons, materiality is very much a question of fact, and
thus "[m]ateriality of information in a Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 case is
ordinarily a jury question, requiring an assessment of the inferences that a
reasonable shareholder would draw from a given set of facts. 68 Thus, "a
complaint may not be properly dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) on the
grounds that the alleged misstatements or omissions are not material unless
they are 'so obviously unimportant to a reasonable investor that reasonable
minds could not differ on the question of their importance. ,,
69
While this paper focuses on materiality, it will be impossible to avoid
discussing reliance as well.7°  To begin with, courts often blur their
materiality and reliance analysis, and that makes discussion of one or the
other in isolation difficult. Furthermore, the issue of reliance becomes a
focus of this paper in Part IV.D, where the issue of how a delayed market
reaction should be analyzed in the context of the Reasonably Available Data
rule is addressed. Thus, the next section will address some of the relevant
issues raised by the reliance element of Rule 1 Ob-5.
B. Reliance
To successfully state a claim for securities fraud under Rule 10b-5,
plaintiffs must prove they relied on the material misstatement or omission in
making their decision to buy or sell the security in question.71  There is,
67. See U.S. v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1298 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Contending there were no
material misstatements or omissions to support his § 10(b) convictions, defendant argues first that
the absence of any market fluctuation in Cluett stock immediately after his 13D was filed
demonstrates that the information was not important to investors .... Turning to defendant's first
point, whether a public company's stock price moves up or down or stays the same after the filing of
a Schedule 13D does not establish the materiality of the statements made, though stock movement is
a factor the jury may consider relevant.").
68. Marksman Partners L.P. v. Chantal Pharm., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1305-06; see also Basic, Inc.
v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988) (describing the determination of materiality as "inherently
fact-specific").
69. Marksman Partners, 927 F. Supp. at 1306 (quoting Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1067
(2d Cir. 1985)); see also Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1489 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[O]nly if
materiality is so obvious that reasonable minds could not differ is summary judgment appropriate.")
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
70. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 499 ("The reliance requirement is a corollary of materiality.").
71. Basic, 485 U.S. at 243. Reliance should be reasonable. Defendants can avail themselves of
the unreasonable reliance doctrine by showing that, had the plaintiff taken the time to read the
relevant document carefully, the truth would have been discovered. See Brown v. E.F. Hutton
Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1032 (2d Cir. 1993) ("An investor may not justifiably rely on a
misrepresentation if, through minimal diligence, the investor should have discovered the truth.").
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however, more than one way to prove reliance in a Rule 1Ob-5 claim. 72 For
example, due to difficulties inherent in proving "how the plaintiff would
have acted had the required information been disclosed," many courts apply
a presumption of reliance in omission cases.73 However, this presumption is
not universally accepted for "half truth" cases (cases where a disclosure is
alleged to be misleading due to a failure to disclose a related material fact)
like the ones at issue here.74 Furthermore, where an investor trades in an
efficient market, there is a presumption that he or she has relied upon the
integrity of that market. In other words, "[b]ecause most publicly available
information is reflected in market price, an investor's reliance on any public
material misrepresentation, therefore, may be presumed for purposes of a
Rule I Ob-5 action."7 5 This is called the fraud-on-the-market presumption.
7 6
The fraud-on-the-market presumption is rebuttable. One of the ways a
defendant may rebut the presumption is to invoke the truth-on-the-market
defense. 77  "Prompt incorporation of news into [the] stock price is the
foundation for the fraud-on-the-market doctrine," and this foundation
"supports a truth-on-the-market doctrine as well." 78 Under the truth-on-the-
market defense, if the truth "credibly entered the market and dissipated the
effects of the misstatements," the presumption of reliance would be
rebutted. 79 However, in order to gain the benefit of the truth-on-the-market
defense, the defendant must show that the truth was "conveyed to the public
'with a degree of intensity and credibility sufficient to counter-balance
effectively any misleading impression created by' the alleged
misstatements.",80 In making this showing, "defendants bear a heavy burden
of proof," and "[s]ummary judgment is proper only if they show that 'no
rational jury could fird' that the market was misled.",81
Some courts have applied the truth-on-the-market doctrine to their
materiality analysis. 82  In addition, courts are not always particularly
72. Basic, 485 U.S. at 243.
73. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 500.
74. See MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 202 (3d ed. 2001) ("Although a
number of courts have recognized this presumption in omission as well as 'half-truth' cases, others
hold to the contrary.").
75. Basic, 485 U.S. at 247.
76. See generally HAZEN, supra note 16, at 501 ("In applying the presumption of reliance and
economic theory, a number of courts fashioned a fraud-on-the-market presumption for proving
reliance.").
77. See id. at 503 ("A number of courts have referred to a 'truth on the market' defense to a
fraud-on-the-market theory of liability.").
78. Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 516 (7th Cir. 1989).
79. Basic, 485 U.S. at 249.
80. Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 167 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting In re Apple
Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 1989)).
81. Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1493 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F.3d
1363, 1376 (9th Cir. 1994)).
82. See Wielgos, 892 F.2d at 518 ("Descriptions in Forms 10-K and registration statements are
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rigorous when it comes to placing the truth-on-the-market defense in their
materiality or reliance analysis. 83  This has furthered the "creep" of the
reliance defense into courts' materiality analysis. However, there are some
potential problems with turning the truth-on-the-market defense to the fraud-
on-the-market presumption of reliance into a materiality defense.
First, while it seems reasonable to conclude that "[b]y its underlying
rationale, the [fraud-on-the-market] presumption also shifts the critical focus
of the materiality inquiry,' 8 4 and that "[in a fraud-on-the-market case the
hypothetical 'reasonable investor,' by reference to whom materiality is
gauged, must be 'the market' itself, because it is the market, not any single
investor, that determines the price of a publicly traded security, 85 there are
some troubling conclusions to this equation. To begin with, at least in the
case of widely followed companies, the conclusions of market makers 86 and
sophisticated investors are likely to dominate those of the individual
reasonable investor. This likelihood seems, in fact, to be the basis for
another of the Supreme Court's recognized means of rebutting the fraud-on-
the-market presumption: a showing that "the 'market makers' were privy to
the truth... and thus that the market price would not have been affected by
the[] misrepresentations.' 87 Thus, equating the reasonable investor with the
market for purposes of the materiality analysis quickly tums into equating
the reasonable investor with sophisticated investors and market makers. Yet
almost useless to individual investors. They require absorption by professional traders and investors.
... Investors who buy 500 shares of stock rely on the market price.... [E]verything we can see
demonstrates that the market had in its possession all significant information about Commonwealth
Edison."). But cf Kapps v. Torch Offshore, Inc., 379 F.3d 207, 215 (5th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he court in
Wielgos stated that it was not addressing the question of whether omitted facts were material, but
was rather ruling on whether the disclosures complied with SEC rules.").
83. Compare Ganino, 228 F.3d at 167 ("Because of the factual dispute over Citizens' share
price, we also reject the defendants' attempt to rely on the so-called 'truth on the market' corollary to
'fraud on the market' as a basis for affirming the district court's decision. Under this corollary, a
misrepresentation is immaterial if the information is already known to the market because the
misrepresentation cannot then defraud the market.") (emphasis added), with id. ("A defendant may
rebut the presumption that its misrepresentations have affected the market price of its stock by
showing that the truth of the matter was already known.") (citing Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224, 248 (1988) ("[Plresumption of reliance in a fraud-on-the-market case may be rebutted by
proving that "the 'market makers' were privy to the truth.")).
84. Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1218 (1st Cir. 1996), superseded by statute on
other grounds, Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 193 (1st Cir. 1999).
85. Id. But cf Basic, 485 U.S. at 240 n. 18 ("We find no authority in the statute, the legislative
history, or our previous decisions for varying the standard of materiality depending on who brings
the action ... ").
86. ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, BUSINESS BASICS FOR LAW STUDENTS 407
(2d ed. 1998) ("A market maker is a dealer who stands ready to buy or sell a specific stock at quoted
prices ... ").
87. Basic, 485 U.S. at 248.
939
this conclusion seemingly turns the recognized definition of materiality on
its head-it is in direct conflict with the explicit "reasonable investor"
standard of TSC Industries.88 As discussed above, the total mix analysis
already allows for defendants to avoid liability via a showing of
immateriality on the basis of the truth having been available-it just views
that argument from the standpoint of the reasonable investor, not the
investment analyst. 9 Furthermore, equating the reasonable investor with the
market for purposes of determining disclosure materiality is, at least in the
registration statement context, in conflict with the SEC's goal of regulating
disclosures with an eye towards all types of investors. 90
Perhaps recognizing these problems, at least one commentator has
concluded that extending the truth-on-the-market defense to materiality
"portends unfortunately narrow tests of materiality."9' In addition, a number
of courts have refused to make the leap, noting that relying on "the 'market
makers' or professional investors [as] the appropriate benchmark for
determining materiality in cases that proceed under the fraud on the market
theory... confuse[s] materiality with fraud on the market., 92
[T]he reasonable investor standard is appropriate in determining
materiality, and the market maker standard is only relevant
when attempting to rebut the fraud on the market presumption
of reliance. While there is a certain amount of redundancy in
the two requirements, the Supreme Court has been quite clear
88. See id. at 236 ("The determination of materiality requires delicate assessments of the
inferences a reasonable shareholder would draw from a given set of facts and the significance of
those inferences to him." (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976)))
(internal alterations and quotation marks omitted); see also Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal
Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1308 n.6 (C.D. Cal. 1996) ("It is true that a defendant may
sometimes be able to rebut the presumption of reliance in a fraud-on-the-market action under Section
10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 by showing that sophisticated buyers, or 'market makers,' were not taken in by
the misrepresentations at issue .... [However], the 'market maker' perspective has no bearing on the
question of materiality, which is based instead on the perspective of a 'reasonable investor."').
89. See Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1097 (1991) ("[N]ot every
mixture with the true will neutralize the deceptive. If it would take a financial analyst to spot the
tension between the one and the other, whatever is misleading will remain materially so, and liability
should follow.").
90. See Kenneth B. Firtel, Note, Plain English: A Reappraisal of the Intended Audience of
Disclosure Under the Securities Act of 1933, 72 So. CAL. L. REv. 851, 851 (1999) ("Over the years,
bitter debate has surrounded the issue of for whom securities disclosure is intended. The Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has maintained that disclosure should be geared toward all
types of investors, from the average investor to the professional financial analyst."); see also Cox
Links Corporate Profits To 'Plain English' Disclosures, 38 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1160 (July 3, 2006)
(discussing proposal to extend successful plain English focus to executive compensation disclosures,
particularly so as to provide "clearer answers to the question 'how much').
91. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 134.
92. Cione v. Gorr, 843 F. Supp. 1199, 1202 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
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and consistent in its use of the reasonable investor standard
in the materiality context.
93
The significance of all this is that if courts consistently allow defendants
to import the truth-on-the-market defense into their materiality analysis in
fraud-on-the-market cases, then a resulting "watering-down" of what
constitutes material information under the case law may occur and overall
disclosure may suffer. 94 This is possible because (1) "the vast body of case
law under [Rule lOb-5] is a type of de facto federal common law of
securities fraud," and (2) "the hallmark of disclosure for both the 1933 Act
registration statement and all 1934 Act filings is embodied in the concept of
'materiality."' 95 Given that defendants should be able to adequately defend
themselves against liability by focusing their truth-on-the-market defense on
the element of reliance, the risk to full and fair disclosure arguably presented
by allowing the doctrine to serve as a materiality defense seems
unnecessary. 96  Either way, "[t]he truth-on-the-market defense is intensely
fact-specific and is rarely an appropriate basis for dismissing a § 10(b)
complaint for failure to plead materiality. 97  Of course, defendants can
successfully reassert the defense at a later stage in the litigation.9 8
93. Id; see also Robinson v. Penn Cent. Co., 336 F. Supp. 655, 657 (E.D. Pa. 1971) ("It may be
that a sophisticated analyst, with knowledge of the corporate world, would ultimately deduce from
the proxy material [the material information]. However, our concern is not the sophisticated analyst,
but the reasonable stockholder .... ).
94. Cf Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Material Vulnerabilities: Data Privacy, Corporate Information
Security, and Securities Regulation, 3 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 129, 186 n.218 (2005) ("As part of 10K
annual reports, public entities are required to disclose all 'material' events in the life of the business
that may impact a shareholder's investment in the entity. The definition of materiality, however, is
in flux and much discretion regarding whether an event is 'material' for disclosure purposes remains
with the company engaging in the disclosures.").
95. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 3, 119. For example, Reg. S-K, Item 303, which provides
instructions for the "Management's Discussion and Analysis" section of an issuer's registration
statement, references the concept of materiality in guiding disclosure on liquidity, capital resources,
results of operations and off-balance sheet arrangements. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2004); see also
17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (2004) ("In addition to the information expressly required to be included in
a statement or report, there shall be added such further material information, if any, as may be
necessary to make the required statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they are
made not misleading.") (emphasis added).
96. Cf Nathenson v. Zonagen, Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 415 (5th Cir. 2001) ("While we agree with
Burlington [Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410 (3d Cir. 1997)] and the district court as to the
requirement, in cases depending on the fraud-on-the-market theory, that the complained of
misrepresentation or omission have actually affected the market price of the stock, we conclude that
it is more appropriate in such cases to relate this requirement to reliance rather than to materiality.
That is how both Basic, [Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1987)] and Abell [v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858
F.2d 1104 (5th Cir.1988), vacated on other grounds sub. nom. Fryar v. Abell, 492 U.S. 914 (1989)]
approach the matter.").
97. Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 167 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Provenz v. Miller, 102
Before moving on to a discussion of the specific problem and proposed
solution addressed by this paper, a few comments regarding scienter and the
heightened pleading standards under the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act are appropriate.
C. Scienter, Loss Causation & Heightened Pleading Standards
In order to prevail on a Rule 1 Ob-5 claim, plaintiffs must prove that the
defendants acted with scienter. 99  In satisfying this element, "the vast
majority of the circuit and district court decisions have found that
recklessness is sufficient" to make the requisite showing.'00 Furthermore,
under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"), a Rule lOb-5
claim must "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference
that the defendant acted with the required state of mind."' 0 ' Whether
pleading facts showing motive and opportunity is sufficient is an open
question. 102 Regardless, plaintiffs in Merck would certainly have a difficult
time carrying their burden on this element even if the omission of the bottomline in that case was found to be material under the Reasonably Available
F.3d 1478, 1493 (1996)) (noting that summary judgment based on the "truth on the market" doctrine
is appropriate only if defendants show that "no rational jury could find that the market was misled")
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also id. at 168 ("[E]ven assuming that HTCC's disclosures
were factually accurate, we cannot decide on the present record whether those disclosures were
conveyed with sufficient 'intensity and credibility' as to dispel the false impression created by
Citizens' alleged misrepresentations. Therefore, we decline to affirm the district court's opinion
based on the 'truth on the market' doctrine.").
98. See In re Newbridge Networks Sec Litig., 962 F. Supp. 166, 178 n.2 (D.D.C. 1997).
99. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 370. But see id. ("However, scienter is not required to establish a
violation of Rule 14a-9's prohibitions against material misstatements and omissions in connection
with a proxy solicitation."). To the extent I argue that the presence of a scienter element in Rule
10b-5 claims should mitigate concerns about the possible plaintiff-friendly effects of the Reasonably
Available Data rule, the lack of a scienter element in cases arising under Rule 14a-9 raises some
interesting questions. While a thorough analysis of these questions is beyond the scope of this
article, it is worth noting that any heightened burden placed on defendants as a result of the interplay
of the Reasonably Available Data rule and the lack of a scienter requirement under Rule 14a-9 may
be justified by the fact that in the proxy solicitation context management is expressly reaching out to
shareholders and requesting them to take action-warranting some lessened "wiggle room" in terms
of disclosure. The issue also arises as to §§ 12(a)(2) and 17(a) of the '33 Act and § 14(e) of the '34
Act. See generally id. at 303, 430.
100. Id. at483.
101. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000). The PSLRA also requires more generally that "the
complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why
the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on
information and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief is
formed." Id. at 74-u(b)(1). This requirement codifies the requirement under Rule 9(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that fraud be pleaded "with particularity." See generally HAZEN,
supra note 16, at 511.
102. See Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin'l Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 658 (8th Cir. 2001)
(noting circuit split).
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Data rule. 103 This is an important point to the extent some may argue that
the Reasonably Available Data rule is too plaintiff-friendly.
Plaintiffs pursuing a Rule 1Ob-5 claim must also prove that the fraud
was the proximate cause of their loss.' 4 While loss causation can be a
highly factual issue, the enhanced pleading requirements for securities fraud
allow for dismissal where a complaint fails "to specifically allege facts
showing loss causation."' 105  Again, this heightened pleading requirement
serves to mitigate any perceived excessive shift in favor of plaintiffs under
the proposed Reasonably Available Data rule. We turn now to examine that
proposed rule, and the problem it is offered to solve.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM AND PROPOSED SOLUTION
A. The Problem
"The courts have generally agreed that readers can put two and two
together, and make somewhat more elaborate calculations or
comparisons."' 106  On its face, this does not appear to be a particularly
troubling practice. However, even a good rule of thumb can create problems
when it is indiscriminately applied. For example, the Third Circuit in Merck
acknowledged that Merck "should have disclosed the amount of co-
payments recognized as revenue .... 07 However, despite this normative
conclusion, the court in effect relied on the Simple Math rule to grant
Merck's motion to dismiss-even though Merck not only failed to disclose
the bottom line but also all the necessary data to calculate it.'0 8 Another
case, Werner v. Werner,09 also from the Third Circuit, held that failure to
disclose the magnitude of the gain flowing to interested directors in
connection with a transaction they were recommending to shareholders was
immaterial because shareholders could calculate that magnitude by: (1)
103. See In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261, 268 (3d Cir. 2005) ("The District Court
discussed briefly the issue of materiality regarding Union's § i0(b) claim, but it did not reach the
issue because it ultimately found that Union had failed sufficiently to show scienter."); see also id. at
271 n.9 ("Scienter and reliance typically would come next in our analysis after materiality. But
because we have decided that the initial S-1 disclosure was not materially false or misleading and
did not omit sufficient facts, we do not discuss scienter here.") (internal citation omitted).
104. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 338 (2005) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4)).
105. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 507.
106. 2 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES
FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD, § 5:237 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter 2 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS].
107. Merck, 432 F.3d at 271.
108. See id.
109. 267 F.3d 288 (3d Cir. 2001).
recognizing that a planned removal of a right of first refusal under an equity
incentive plan, as set forth in the relevant 1997 proxy statement, would
benefit management;" l (2) then looking "to the 1993 and 1994 annual
reports to determine how many shares were issued each year pursuant to the
Restricted Stock Plan";" l' (3) then using those same reports to "determine
the approximate fair market value ('FMV') of Restricted shares at the date
of issuance";"12 (4) then employing the equation "[(FMV 1997 - FMV in
1993) x number of shares issued in 1993] + [(FMV 1997 - FMV 1994) x
number of shares issued in 1994]" in order to "compute the amount of
money the management defendants would have gotten for their shares had
the right of first refusal been exercised";" 3 and then finally, (5) comparing
"the amount yielded by the above equation to the $66 million the
management defendants would actually receive in the Recapitalization as
proposed."'"1 4 At least some would agree that this labyrinth-like disclosure
of a material fact" 5 is not consistent with a philosophy of full and fair
disclosure." 6 These and other examples of application of the Simple Math
rule that seemingly permit less than full and fair disclosure are examined
further below.
110. Id. at 299.
111. Id. at 299-300.
112. Id. at 300.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 777 (2d Cir. 1991) ("That inside directors
stand to gain from a recommended transaction is material information that must be disclosed to
shareholders considering a tender offer. Moreover, we may assume for purposes of our decision that
there is reasonable likelihood that the magnitude of such a gain would be considered important by
the reasonable investor in deciding how to act and is thus also material information." (internal
citation omitted) (citing TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); Basic, Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988))).
116. See Kennedy v. Tallant, 710 F.2d 711, 720 (1 1th Cir. 1983) ("The district judge found that
any relevant disclosures with regard to control were so fragmented throughout the prospectuses that
the average person would not understand their import. We agree. Full and fair disclosure cannot be
achieved through piecemeal release of subsidiary facts which if stated together might provide a
sufficient statement of the ultimate fact."); Royce de R. Barondes, Adequacy of Disclosure of
Restrictions on Flipping IPO Securities, 74 TUL. L. REv. 883, 921-22 (2000) ("[I]t appears that
Kennedy holds actionable the failure to summarize information, or provide a conclusion that appears
self-evident, based on the fact that the information in question was spread out over a few pages. If
the knowledge and effort required to assimilate that information is sufficiently substantial to make
disclosure misleading, it follows a fortiori that the general availability of information in the market
does not necessarily eliminate the materiality of its omission. The SEC's recent requirement that
prospectuses be drafted in 'plain English' similarly indicates the importance of the manner in which
disclosure is made.").
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B. The Proposed Solution
There is a tension in the law of securities regulation, between the desire
to protect investors via full and fair disclosure, 1 7 and the desire to avoid the
negative consequences of excessive litigation and overly burdensome
disclosure requirements.118 This tension is first addressed in the particular
statutes and regulations that make up the Securities Act and the Exchange
Act. In addition, various common law "safety valves" have sprung up in
order to allow courts to manage securities cases in light of various market
and litigation realities. On the one hand, there exists the reality that
securities fraud cases are routinely decided on the motions. Because of the
great cost associated with litigating these claims, if corporations do not
prevail on their motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment, they
will generally have to settle the case. 19 Thus, courts have employed
doctrines such as "bespeaks caution" 120 and "puffery"1 2' to allow them to
decide cases on the motions where otherwise there would be questions of
fact (particularly as to materiality) remaining. The rule-of-thumb that I am
calling the Simple Math rule-which states that requiring investors to
perform mathematical calculations to determine the bottom line does not
constitute fraud as a matter of law--can be seen as one of these safety
valves, designed to relieve some of the excessive litigation pressure created
by frivolous lawsuits. However, in its application the rule seemingly differs
from other safety valves in that it does not require the courts to perform any
balancing of the particular facts.
In this paper, I am proposing an alternative to the Simple Math rule-
the Reasonably Available Data rule. The Reasonably Available Data rule
would continue to recognize that investors "can put two and two together,
117. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 107-204 (2002) ("An Act To protect investors by improving the
accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws .... ").
118. See, e.g., Pub. L. No.104-67 (1995) ("An Act to reform Federal securities litigation ... .
119. 1 propose the Reasonably Available Data rule as generally applicable. In this paper,
however, I will focus on its relevance in the context of dismissal and summary judgment motions.
This focus is important because it is at these stages of litigation that courts set precedent for what is
material as a matter of law.
120. See In re Donald J. Trump Casino, 7 F.3d 357, 364 (3d Cir. 1993) ("The linchpin of the
district court's decision was what has been described as the 'bespeaks caution' doctrine, according to
which a court may determine that the inclusion of sufficient cautionary statements in a prospectus
renders misrepresentations and omissions contained therein nonactionable.").
121. See Nathenson v. Zonagen, Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 417 n.15 (5th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he statements
were at most mere optimistic generalizations consisting of 'the type of 'puffing' that ...[the]
circuits have consistently held to be inactionable'" (quoting Lasker v. New York State Elec. & Gas
Corp., 85 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 1996))).
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and make somewhat more elaborate calculations or comparisons." 121
However, it would require courts to apply more analytical rigor in situations
where strict application of the Simple Math rule would risk the
underinclusiveness feared by the Supreme Court where bright line rules are
applied in connection with materiality determinations.' 23 Where a defendant
argues that failure to disclose the bottom line was immaterial because the
data necessary to calculate it was disclosed, courts should approach their
analysis in a manner similar to other cases where a defendant points to
separate disclosures to prove a challenged representation or omission
immaterial. In accord with the relevant materiality factors discussed above,
courts should not simply ask whether the necessary data was disclosed. 124
Rather, borrowing from the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, they should first
ask whether all the relevant pieces of data necessary to calculate the bottom
line were disclosed proximately to one another and the place where a
reasonable investor would expect to find them. 125 If so, the court can stop its
analysis and properly apply the Simple Math rule. 126  If the data is not
sufficiently proximate, then, in accord with a "total mix" analysis, they
should ask whether that data was reasonably available, specifically checking
to see if it was cross-referenced to. If the court concludes the data was not
reasonably available, the motion to dismiss should be denied. If the data
was reasonably available, then the question becomes-in accord with the
hidden facts doctrine-whether the import of the data was sufficiently
highlighted to alert the reasonable investor. 127 Again, if the import of the
data was not sufficiently highlighted, the court should deny the motion to
122. 2 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 106, at § 5:237.
123. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 n.14 (1988); see also id. at 236 ("After much
study, the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure cautioned the SEC against administratively
confining materiality to a rigid formula. Courts also would do well to heed this advice." (internal
footnote omitted)).
124. I do not argue that factors such as proximity and the presence of cross-referencing should be
relevant under the Reasonably Available Data rule because they are factors under other materiality
doctrines. Rather, I believe the various factors I propose are appropriate on their own merit. The
fact that they are employed in the application of other materiality doctrines supports, rather than
mandates, this conclusion.
125. See Mills v. Elec. Autolite Co., 403 F.2d 429, 434 n.5 (1968) ("The language used and the
position and emphasis given to each statement[] may be considered in determining whether there has
been a fair and candid disclosure of a material fact." (quoting Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp.
538, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1967))) (internal alterations omitted), vacated on other grounds, 396 U.S. 375
(1970).
126. One possible exception may be where the equation necessary to calculate the bottom line is
so complicated as to make calculation unreasonable. In such a case, dismissal may be improper even
where all the data is proximately disclosed.
127. See Kohn v. Am. Metal Climax, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 1331, 1362 (E.D. Pa. 1971) ("The
Securities Exchange Act requires more than disclosure, it requires adequate disclosure. The more
material the facts, the more they should be brought to the attention of the public. To view it
otherwise would be to invite frustration of the policies underlying our disclosure laws. Accordingly,
we have found certain facts to be 'buried' in the explanatory materials. These facts should have in
some way been highlighted to insure that the shareholders were aware of them.").
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dismiss. 128  Furthermore, failure to disclose the bottom line in connection
with a corrective disclosure should constitute an additional factor weighing
against defendants. As will be discussed more below, it is reasonable to
assume that the risk of misleading investors by failing to disclose the bottom
line is even greater with a corrective disclosure. And finally, where the
market reacts negatively to a subsequent disclosure of the bottom line, a
presumption of materiality should be applied. 
129
From a policy standpoint, the Reasonably Available Data rule makes
sense. One may presume that the Simple Math rule advances the policy
objective of allowing courts to dismiss frivolous suits that would otherwise
continue to trial. This is so because the materiality of failure to disclose the
bottom line would ordinarily present a question of fact not appropriately
decided as a matter of law. By providing courts with a safety valve uniquely
applicable to such cases, the Simple Math rule serves a purpose most would
agree is desirable. However, as will be demonstrated below, application of
the Simple Math rule casts too wide a net. It results in the dismissal of
claims that seemingly can only appear frivolous to supporters of corporate
protectionism. The Reasonably Available Data rule, on the other hand, also
serves a safety valve function, but in the context of an analytical scheme less
likely to dismiss legitimate claims. This is particularly important in light of
the fact that, as discussed above, judicial materiality determinations
influence securities regulation far beyond the four comers of a particular
opinion. Furthermore, strict adherence to the Simple Math rule creates
128. See id. at 1363 ("[T]he stockholders are only referred generally to Appendix Q.... This does
not sufficiently highlight [the material] fact."). Cf Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 753 (1975) ("The SEC, in accord with the congressional purposes, specifically requires
prominent emphasis be given in filed registration statements and prospectuses to material adverse
contingencies.").
129. One (perhaps) obvious question is why we need a new rule at all. Can't we just apply
existing materiality doctrines more effectively? I believe there are two answers to this question.
First, results will be too inconsistent without adopting a rule specifically applicable in cases where
defendants have only disclosed the data necessary to calculate the bottom line. There is nothing
preventing courts from applying the existing doctrine currently (and, indeed, some do-see, e.g.,
Robinson v. Penn Cent. Co., 336 F. Supp. 655, 657 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (applying buried facts doctrine
to find violation of '34 Act even though it was possible to "deduce from the proxy material" that
"the debt would have grown from $50,000,000 to $80,000,000")), yet we are still left with the
problematic cases cited in this article. Second, it is my contention that none of the existing
materiality doctrines fully addresses the concerns raised by Simple Math cases. The decision-tree
analysis proposed here constitutes an improvement over the existing doctrine by providing more
flexibility than the Simple Math rule, while still providing the necessary guidance to corporations in
formulating their disclosures. See, e.g., Werner v. Werner, 267 F.3d 288, 298 (3d Cir. 2001)
(finding adequate disclosure despite the necessity of a five to six-step equation to calculate the
bottom line because "the Restricted Stock Plan was prominently addressed in a contiguous section of
the letter accompanying the 1991 annual report, as well as in the report itself and in subsequent
annual reports").
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incentives for corporations to provide less information and expect
shareholders to engage in greater extrapolation-a result at odds with the
undergirding securities regulation philosophy of full and fair disclosure. 130
Conversely, the Reasonably Available Data rule will encourage corporations
to think not only about whether they are disclosing all necessary numbers,
but whether the impact of combining those numbers in some meaningful
way is material. The corporate scandals of recent memory suggest courts
should tread cautiously in rendering rulings that encourage corporations to
"hide the ball" from investors.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED SOLUTION TO RELEVANT CASE LAW
The relevant cases can be broken up into four groups. The first group is
made up of those cases where all the pieces of information necessary to
calculate the bottom line are disclosed proximately to one another and to the
statement alleged to have been made materially misleading by the omission
of the bottom line, or to the place where disclosure of the bottom line would
have reasonably been expected. I argue that this is the group of cases where
the Simple Math rule works well. The data is clearly reasonably available to
the investor and no cross-references are required.
In the second group of cases, all the pieces of data necessary to calculate
the bottom line are not disclosed proximately to one another or to the
statement alleged to have been made materially misleading by the omission
of the bottom line or the place where disclosure would be expected. 131 Here,
I argue courts act too quickly when they dismiss claims simply by invoking
the Simple Math rule. Rather, courts should ask whether the data was
disclosed in such a manner-looking to the factors set forth above-to
warrant ignoring the general rule that "[m]ateriality of information in a []
Rule 1 Ob-5 case is ordinarily a jury question, requiring an assessment of the
inferences that a reasonable shareholder would draw from a given set
of facts." 1
32
The third group of cases are those in which the omission occurred in
connection with a corrective disclosure. 133 I argue that where a corporation
130. See generally In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding that the
corporation's non-disclosure of subsidiary's revenue-recognition practices was not a material
omission).
131. A good argument can be made that this group should be divided further into cases where the
necessary data was completely disclosed and cases, like Merck, where anyone desiring to calculate
the bottom line was required to make an assumption or fill in some missing piece of data. The latter
group of cases would raise the issue of when leaving a blank in the necessary calculation equates to
non-disclosure of the necessary data.
132. Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1305-06 (C.D. Cal.
1996).
133. Note that there may be overlap of groups. When that occurs, the argument against ruling in
favor of defendants on motions to dismiss or summary judgment is even greater.
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is making a corrective disclosure, it is reasonable for investors to expect
disclosure of the bottom line impact if it is significant. Where this is not
done, the message is, in effect: "We admit we did something wrong, but it
was merely a technical violation-no real harm resulted." Thus, where the
bottom line is omitted in connection with a corrective disclosure, courts
should count that fact against defendants.
Finally, the fourth group of cases are those in which the market reacts
negatively after the bottom line is publicly disclosed. Courts may brush
aside plaintiffs' arguments that the market took time to digest material
information by concluding that such an argument destroys the basis (where
applicable) for plaintiffs' fraud-on-the-market presumptive reliance. This is
one of the arguments relied on by the Third Circuit in Merck: "[Plaintiff] is
trying to have it both ways: the market understood all the good things that
Merck said about its revenue but was not smart enough to understand the
[revenue] disclosure.,' 34 I argue, however, that because the very crux of
these cases is that the bottom line was not disclosed, the failure of the market
to "do the math" immediately should not deprive plaintiffs of the fraud-on-
the-market presumption in light of the policy reasons in favor of
the presumption.
A. The "Proximately Disclosed" Cases
In Starr v. Georgeson Shareholder, Inc., the Second Circuit held that an
exchange agent's failure to disclose the total fee charged for providing its
service was immaterial as a matter of law where the agent properly disclosed
the fee per share. 135  In that case, Georgeson Shareholder, Inc.
("Georgeson"), had been brought in to facilitate a post-merger "clean up" of
shares to be converted in two separate mergers--one in which Vodafone
Group, Plc ("Vodafone"), was the surviving entity, and one in which AT&T
Corporation ("AT&T") was the surviving entity. 136 Plaintiff tendered shares
to Georgeson in connection with both mergers, and filed suit after
Georgeson allegedly deducted roughly nine percent of the tendered stock's
value in connection with the Vodafone merger, and roughly twelve percent
in connection with the AT&T merger. 137  However, Georgeson had
expressly disclosed the $3.50 (per Vodafone share) and $7 (per AT&T
134. Merck, 432 F.3d at 270.
135. 412 F.3d 103, 111 (2d Cir. 2005).
136. Id. at 105 ("Georgeson was retained to 'clean up' the mergers by locating and soliciting
missing or reluctant shareholders to convert their pre-merger stock into shares of the post-merger
companies.").
137. Id. at 107-08.
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share) processing fees in the body of the notices sent soliciting tender of the
shares. '38 The Second Circuit concluded that:
Simply multiplying these fees by the number of stock certificates
held would have provided a shareholder with the fee Georgeson
charged to exchange shares. We agree [with the District Court] that
"[r]equiring [a] stockholder to perform the two-minute
multiplication to ascertain the fee is not an 'omission' for which the
law gives redress."' 3 9
Similarly, in Gavin v. AT&T Corp.,140 the District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, in addressing a similar claim against Georgeson
brought by a different plaintiff, found the omission of the total fee to be
immaterial as a matter of law:
The notice clearly stated that the fee would be $7 for each share of
AT&T to be received, and the claim card attached to the notice
indicated the number of those shares. Georgeson's failure to
perform the one-step multiplication required to ascertain the total
fee is not an omission for which the securities laws provide redress.
The securities laws are intended to require fair disclosure, but do
not require corporations to "attribute to investors a child-like
simplicity ...." This claim fails. 141
These results are consistent with the Reasonably Available Data rule
proposed here. All the data necessary to perform the calculation was
disclosed together and where a reasonable investor would have expected it to
be. In such a case, courts are justified in relying on the Simple Math rule to
dismiss cases claiming a violation of the securities laws based upon a failure
138. Id. at 106, 108.
139. Id. at 111 (quoting Starr v. Georgeson S'holder, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 2d 410, 414 (S.D.N.Y.
2003)).
140. No. 01 C 2721, 2005 WL 1563122 (N.D. Ill. June 7,2005).
141. Id. at *12 (quoting Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 234 (1988)) (internal citations
omitted). While I agree with the result, it is interesting to note that the Gavin court relied on the
Supreme Court's admonition not to attribute a child-like simplicity to investors in order to support
the non-disclosure of information. In making this statement, the Supreme Court was in fact urging
disclosure, rebutting the argument that investors would be unable to understand the uncertainty
inherent in premerger negotiations:
Disclosure, and not paternalistic withholding of accurate information, is the policy
chosen and expressed by Congress .... The role of the materiality requirement is not to
attribute to investors a child-like simplicity, an inability to grasp the probabilistic
significance of negotiations, but to filter out essentially useless information that a
reasonable investor would not consider significant, even as part of a larger mix of factors
to consider in making his investment decision.
Basic, 485 U.S. at 234 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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to disclose the bottom line-and application of the Reasonably Available
Data rule would obtain the same result.
B. The "Dispersed Data" Cases
The first dispersed data case we shall turn to is the Merck case cited in
the Introduction. In that case, Merck was planning to spin off its wholly-
owned subsidiary, Medco, in a 2002 IPO. 142 Medco, as a pharmacy benefits
manager ("PBM"), "saves its clients (plan sponsors) money by negotiating
discount rates with pharmacies and influencing doctors to prescribe cheaper,
but still therapeutically appropriate, medicines."' 143 When a plan beneficiary
buys drugs at a pharmacy, Medco confirms the beneficiary's plan
enrollment.'" The beneficiary is then charged only a co-payment for the
drug-usually less than $15. 145 The co-payment belongs to the pharmacy. 146
Medco, however, recognized these co-payments as its own revenue.
147
Furthermore, Merck, in its 1999 10-K, "stated that Medco recognized
revenue 'for the amount billed to the plan sponsor.' ' 148 In connection with
an auditor change, Merck changed its disclosure in its 2001 10-K to read
"that revenues were 'recognized based on the prescription drug price
negotiated with the plan sponsor.' 149
142. In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261, 264 (3d Cir. 2005).
143. Id.; see also Barbara Martinez, Selling Generic Drugs by Mail Turns Into Lucrative Business,
WALL ST. J., May 9, 2006, at Al ("For a while, a good chunk of the PBMs' profits came from
incentives provided by drug makers. PBMs would try to badger doctors into switching prescriptions
to a particular brand. The PBMs could reap lucrative rebates from drug makers for doing this. After
an outcry about the practice a few years ago, PBMs started sharing more of the rebates with
employers."); Martinez, supra, at Al ("In many industries, middlemen scrape by on small margins.
Not so in generic drugs. Documents from 2001 filed in an Ohio court case show that Medco Health
Solutions Inc. paid $90 that year for the pills to fill 114 prescriptions for a generic copy of Valium.
Medco sent its client, the State Teachers Retirement System of Ohio, a bill of $1, 028 for the drugs,
which also reflected its dispensing costs. Medco paid $766 for the pills to fill hundreds of
prescriptions for the blood-pressure medicine atenolol. It billed the Ohio teachers $25, 628.").
144. Merck, 432 F.3d at 264.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.; see also Barbara Martinez, Merck to Proceed With the IPO of 20% of Medco Benefits
Units, WALL ST. J., July 9, 2002, at A6 ("A Merck spokeswoman said: 'In 1999 we had discussions
with the SEC about Medco revenue-recognition practices. We expanded our public disclosure in
this area and the SEC raised no further questions.').
149. Merck, 432 F.3d at 264. It should be noted that Medco believed it could properly recognize
the co-payments as revenue under the applicable accounting standards, id., and "Merck apparently
subtracted out these co-payments later, so its profit numbers were unaffected by this policy." Id. at
264 n.2.
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On April 17, 2002, in Merck's initial S-I filing in connection with the
planned Medco offering, Merck for the first time disclosed that Medco had
recognized the co-payments as revenue. 50 The disclosure consisted of a
"brief mention of Medco's revenue-recognition policy" in the "200-page"
filing.'51 More importantly for our purposes, Merck did not disclose the
total amount of additional revenue recognized. 152 The market's response to
this disclosure was a resounding yawn. 153
However, on June 21, 2002, an article in The Wall Street Journal
reported on Medco's practice of recognizing co-payments as revenue, and
estimated that those co-payments totaled $4.6 billion in 2001.154 This time,
the market shuddered-Merck's stock dropped from $52.20 to $49.98 that
same day. ' Six days later, Merck postponed "the Medco IPO and indicated
it would drop the Medco offering price."' 15 6 On July 5, 2002, Merck filed its
fourth S-1, finally disclosing the full amount of co-payments recognized as
revenue. 57 In that disclosure, it revealed that the actual amount of co-
payments never received but recognized as revenue by Medco was $5.54
billion' '-almost $1 billion more than had originally been calculated by
The Wall Street Journal reporter based on an assumption due to the
disclosure's incompleteness. 159 The following business day, Merck shares
slipped another $1.05, or 2.2%. 160 Overall, Medco had recognized in excess
of $12.4 billion dollars in co-payment revenue over the course of 3 years:
$5.537 billion in 2001; $4.036 billion in 2000; and $2.838 billion in 1999.161
By July 10, the day after the close of the class period, 62 Merck's stock had
dropped to $43.57,163 for a total decline of about 17% from the date of The
Wall Street Journal article.
150. Id. at 264.
151. Martinez, supra note 148, at A6.
152. Merck, 432 F.3d at 264.
153. Id. ("The day this S-I was filed, Merck's stock price went up $0.03--from $55.02 to
$55.05.").
154. Id. at 265 (citing Barbara Martinez, Merck Included Co-Payments Among Revenue, WALL
ST. J., June 21,2002, at C).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See Martinez, supra note 148, at A6.
160. Id. ("A brief mention of Medco's revenue-recognition policy first appeared in a 200-page
Securities and Exchange Commission filing in April. It wasn't until this past Friday, however, that
Merck detailed that between 1999 and 2001, retail co-payments represented $12.4 billion, or nearly
10%, of Merck's overall reported revenue.... [the following Monday] Merck shares slipped $1.05,
or 2.2%... to $47.81 in 4 p.m. composite trading on the New York Stock Exchange.").
161. Merck, 432 F.3d at 265.
162. Id. at 264 n.1 ("The class period runs from January 26, 2000, to July 9, 2002.").
163. Id. at 265.
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The Third Circuit focused its materiality analysis on the disclosure by
Merck, in its April 17th S-I, of the fact that Medco had recognized co-
payments never received as revenue.164 Touting its "'clearest commitment'
to the efficient market hypothesis," and stating that "the materiality of
disclosed information may be measured post hoc by looking to the
movement, in the period immediately following disclosure, of the price of
the firm's stock," the Court concluded that Medco's recognizing co-payment
revenue was immaterial as a matter of law because the price of Merck's
stock did not decline after disclosure of the practice. 165 As for the argument
that, by failing to disclose the magnitude of co-payment revenue recognized,
"the April 17th disclosure was so opaque that it should not have counted as a
disclosure[,]" the Court held that since all the necessary information to
calculate the amount of excess revenue recognition was available when the
April 17th disclosure was made, failure to do the calculation for investors
was immaterial. 166
Was this the correct result? The court acknowledged that "Merck was
clearly treading a fine line with this delayed, piecemeal disclosure[,]" and
"decline[d] to decide how many mathematical calculations [were] too many"
because it did "not wish to reward opaqueness." 167 Nevertheless, the court
granted Merck's motion to dismiss, minimizing the stock price's drop in
response to the Wall Street Journal ("Journal") article by stating that "[t]he
Journal reporter simply did the math on June 21." 168 This fact, however,
simply begs the questions posed here: Who should do the math? And, when
can a defendant rely on an assumption that the market will do it? Ironically,
the Third Circuit seemingly contradicted itself when it answered these
questions by stating that Merck "should have disclosed the amount of co-
payments recognized as revenue in the April s-1 .,,169
The Reasonably Available Data rule would likely not have allowed
Merck to prevail on its motion to dismiss on the basis of the Simple Math
rule because the necessary data was not all disclosed where the reasonable
164. Id. at 269.
165. Id. (quoting Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 282 (3d. Cir. 2000)). Apparently, however, the
Third Circuit's commitment to the efficient market hypothesis is not without its limits. See Oran,
226 F.3d at 285 n.5 (considering it "more reasonable" that a four percent drop in the share price of a
pharmaceutical company was due to a "delayed investor reaction" to a two-day-old drug withdrawal
announcement rather than the same-day disclosure-in the New York Times and Wall Street
Journal--of the company's prior knowledge of one of its drug's possible connection to heart-valve
abnormalities).
166. Merck, 432 F.3d at 270.
167. Id.at271.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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investor would expect to find it (in fact, part of the necessary data was not
disclosed at all), and there remained too many questions about whether the
"piecemeal disclosure,' 70 was made in such a way as to offset the arguably
misleading impression created by Merck's failure to disclose it. A good
argument can be made that this alone should have been sufficient to allow
the plaintiff to avoid dismissal. However, as will be discussed further
below, Merck also involved a corrective disclosure and a price drop in
connection with public disclosure of the bottom line. 71 These are additional
factors weighing against dismissal under the Reasonably Available
Data rule.
The Reasonably Available Data rule recognizes that it is appropriate to
dismiss securities claims based on a failure to disclose the bottom line where
all the pieces of data necessary to calculate that bottom line were disclosed
proximately to one another. In Merck, the Journal reporter needed to make
an assumption regarding the average co-payment in order to calculate the
bottom line. 172 In fact, it was because her assumption was incorrect, that the
co-payment revenue she reported was actually low. 173 But this was not just
a case of Merck's failing to provide a necessary piece of data. According to
the Journal article, Merck affirmatively refused to disclose its average
co-payment. 174
Given that this was not a case where all the necessary data was
proximately disclosed, the question under the Reasonably Available Data
rule would become whether the data was nonetheless disclosed in such a
manner as to warrant a court's allowing it to serve as a proxy for explicit
disclosure of the bottom line. 175 In Merck's case, this seems to be an open
170. Id.
171. Id.at264-65.
172. Id. at 270 ("The Journal reporter arrived at an estimate of $4.6 billion of co-payments
recognized in 2001 by using one assumption and performing one subtraction and one multiplication
on the information contained in the April S-1. She determined the number of retail prescriptions
filled (462 million) by subtracting home-delivery prescriptions filled (75 million) from total
prescriptions filled (537 million). She then assumed an average $10 co-payment and multiplied that
average co-payment by the number of retail prescriptions filled to get $4.6 billion.").
173. Id. at 270 n.7 ("[Plaintiff] makes much of the difference between the estimated $4.6 billion
and the actual $5.54 billion, but had the Journal reporter used a slightly higher average co-payment,
this difference would have been smaller. She noted that '$10 to $15 is typical in the industry.'
[Barbara Martinez, Merck Included Co-Payments Among Revenue, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2002, at
Cl]. Had she used $12.50, the average of $10 and $15, she would have come up with $5.78
billion.").
174. Barbara Martinez, Merck Included Co-Payments Among Revenue, WALL ST. J., June 21,
2002, at C1 ("Merck won't disclose its average co-payment amount, though most co-payments
industrywide fall between $5 and $50.").
175. l am assuming, of course, that a court would not conclude that $5.54 billion is an immaterial
amount of revenue. This is, of course, an alternative "out" for defendants-that the amount itself is
immaterial. Notably, none of the relevant cases discussed in this paper took that approach. Rather,
they said, in one form or another, that failure to disclose the bottom line was an immaterial omission
because it could have been calculated from the disclosed data.
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question of fact precluding dismissal or grant of summary judgment. On the
one hand, there are facts supporting the conclusion that the market did the
math and found it immaterial. 176 For example, Merck's stock price was not
running up in the period between announcement of the planned Medco IPO
and public disclosure of Medco's revenue recognition practice. Merck's
stock price on January 2, 2002, the day the Medco IPO was announced,
closed at $59.76.177 By April 17, 2002, the day Merck disclosed the revenue
recognition practice, the price had dropped to $55.05. 178 This could suggest
that the misrepresentation regarding Medco's revenue recognition policies
was not material. 179  However, Medco's revenue recognition practice had
been going on long before the IPO announcement, so it would take further
analysis to determine whether price inflation had already been incorporated
into the market price. 80  Furthermore, while the stock price dropped from
$52.20 to $49.98 following the Journal article, 181 many analysts viewed this
simply as market "panic."' 182  However, at least one downgraded Merck's
176. Merck, 432 F.3d at 270-71.
177. Yahoo Finance, Merck & Co. Inc. (Jan. 2, 2002), http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=Mrk
(enter "January 2, 2002" in "set date range" for start date and end date) (last visited Feb. 7, 2007).
178. Id. (enter "April 17, 2002" in "set date range" for start date and end date) (last visited Feb. 7,
2007).
179. See Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1306 (C.D. Ca.
1996) ("[T]he fact that the stock price rose dramatically while the market was receiving the alleged
misstatements... support[s] the conclusion that the false statements were 'material."').
180. See Barbara Martinez, Merck Booked $12.4 Billion It Never Collected-Co-Payments to
Pharmacies Lifted Drug Giant's Revenue; Firm Stands by Treatment, WALL ST. J., July 8, 2002, at
Al ("The company didn't disclose how much it may have booked in revenue from co-payments
from 1993 to 1998. Merck acquired Medco in 1993.").
181. Ed Silverman, Merck Stands by Medco Accounting: Stock Falls 4%; Medco IPO Set for Next
Week, STAR-LEDGER, June 22, 2002, http://www.vaccinationnews.comIDailyNews/June2002/
MerckStandsByMedcoAcct22.htm ("Merck stock fell $2.22, or 4.25 percent, closing at $49.98, a
new four-year low, on more than twice the normal daily trading volume. The report first appeared in
yesterday's Wall Street Journal.").
182. See, e.g., Merck-Medco Spinning Off From Parent Amid Revenue Recognition Controversy;
Future Uncertain, Drug Cost Management Report, July 2002, http://findarficles.com/p/articles/mi-
mONKV/is_7_3/ai_89237275 ("While some investors may be spooked by any critique of PBM
accounting practices in the post-Enron era, many analysts are advising that the revenue recognition
issue has no bearing on the stock value for either Merck & Co. or Medco Health Solutions."); Merck
Sinks on Medco Report, USA TODAY.com, June 21, 2002, http://www.usatoday.com/money/health/
2002-06-21-merck-medco.htm ("'In general, investors in pharmacy benefits managers who
understand the financials of these companies do not look at revenue in their assessment,' said Bane
of America Securities analyst Patrick Hojlo ..... 'To portray this as an attempt to mislead investors is
a big stretch,' Hojlo said about Merck's accounting policy."); Silverman, supra note 181 ("Analysts
were divided over the ramifications, but few were surprised at Wall Street's reaction, given ongoing
concerns over accounting practices at large companies .... One tax expert, however, said Merck
didn't appear to violate accounting rules and that investor reaction may have been overblown. 'I
think they're accounting for revenue correctly,' said Robert Willens, a tax and accounting analyst at
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stock in response to the Journal disclosure.183 Furthermore, there can be
little doubt that Merck pushed its revenue numbers in painting a rosy picture
of its own future. For example, in a 2000 press release, the company
repeatedly stressed its revenue growth:
Merck has created a strong platform for growth and is delivering
outstanding performance, Merck Chairman, President and CEO
Raymond V. Gilmartin told more than 300 securities analysts today
at the Annual Business Briefing. "As a company, Merck is totally
focused on growth," said Mr. Gilmartin. "And, we have made
significant investments in those areas that can enable us to achieve
our goal to be a top-tier growth company over the long term:
cutting-edge science, strong and innovative new products, and
Merck-Medco, the nation 's leading provider of pharmacy care.
"We are now seeing exceptional evidence of our strength and our
future potential," Mr. Gilmartin said. In six of the last seven
quarters, Merck's revenue growth for its pharmaceutical and
vaccine businesses worldwide ranked either No. 1 or No. 2 within
the industry. For the last three consecutive quarters, Merck's
revenue growth ranked No. 1 in the pharmaceutical industry. 
184
And, the amount of revenue in question here was certainly not
insignificant. "The co-payments that Medco booked as revenue at retail
pharmacies in 2001 amounted to $5.5 billion, representing 11% of Merck's
2001 overall revenue of $50.69 billion."' 185  The total revenue booked but
never actually collected by Merck under this accounting method in the years
1999-2001 was $12.4 billion. 186
Lehman Bros. 'There's been a lot of legitimate accounting issues raised lately, but this doesn't
strike me as one of them.' For the same reason, Hemant Shah, an independent securities analyst who
tracks the drug industry, downplayed the disclosure. 'Certainly, people may be more cautious
toward the offering,' said Shah. 'But this practice doesn't effect net income or cash flow. So at the
end of the day, it's a non-issue."'); Drug Giant Merck Misled on Revenues, THE STANDARD-TIMES,
July 9, 2002, at A13, http://www.s-t.com/daily/07-02/07-09-02/a13bu069.htm ("Analysts weren't
too concerned, suggesting that many investors were simply locking in profits from Friday's big
advance.") [hereinafter Drug Giant].
183. Drug Giant, supra note 182, at A13 ("Merck, based in Whitehouse Station, N.J., said
yesterday its treatment was in accord with generally accepted accounting practices and had no
impact on its earnings since the revenue was offset in its financial reports as an expense. But its
stock fell amid heightened investor suspicion about accounting issues. The stock closed down $1.05
to $47.81. Meanwhile, Merrill Lynch downgraded the stock, citing the possibility of a delay in the
planned spinoff of its Merck Medco unit.").
184. Merck Cites Strong Growth in Presentation to Analysts: Momentum of Key Products Fuels
Confidence in Company's Future, PRNewswire, Dec. 12, 2000, http://www.presseportal.de/story-
rss.htx?nr-202685&firmaid=8150 (emphasis added); see also 5B ARNOLD S. JACOBS, LITIGATION
AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10B-5 § 61.02[c], at 3-193 (West 1999) ("[A] company deciding to
issue a press release shows that the company thought the data were significant.").
185. Martinez, supra note 180, at Al.
186. Id.
[Vol. 34: 927, 20071 Who Should Do the Math?
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
While the Third Circuit opined that it was impossible for the market to
have failed to calculate these amounts immediately upon disclosure of
Medco's revenue recognition practice, 187 the Journal concluded that
"[t]hough the revenue-recognition policy was disclosed within Merck's 200-
page SEC filing in April, the policy wasn't widely known by investors or
Wall Street analysts until it was reported by The Wall Street Journal [on
June 2 1st]." 188 While the Third Circuit scoffed at what it saw as plaintiffs'
argument that "investors and analysts stood in uncomprehending suspension
for over two months until the Journal brought light to the market's
darkness,"' 89 it seemed in the same breath to be saying that an article
appearing on the front page of the Journal's "Money & Investing" section
(in the popular "Heard on the Street" column) was not news. The Third
Circuit framed the issue as "whether needing [some] mathematical
proficiency to make sense of the [policy] disclosure negates the disclosure
itself."' 90 However, a better statement of the issue would have been whether
disclosure of the fact of a revenue recognition policy, plus enough data to
calculate the bottom line impact of that policy (given the making of an
accurate assumption), equals disclosure of that bottom line so as to
constitute complete disclosure. 19' One seemingly cannot answer that
question without looking deeper than simply whether the data was disclosed.
One would need to know where and how the data was disclosed and whether
it was disclosed in such a manner as to make calculation reasonably likely-
the Reasonably Available Data rule would have required such an inquiry.
There was also an allegation that Medco's accounting practices violated
Generally Accepted Accounting Practices ("GAAP"). 192 Given that this was
187. In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261, 270-71 (3d Cir. 2005) ("[T]he added, albeit
minimal, arithmetic complexity of the calculation hardly undermines faith in an efficient market....
An efficient market for good news is an efficient market for bad news. The Journal reporter simply
did the math on June 21; the efficient market hypothesis suggests that the market made these basic
calculations months earlier.").
188. Martinez, supra note 180, at Al.
189. Merck, 432 F.3d at 270.
190. Id.
191. One could also frame the issue as whether the disclosure of the data necessary to calculate
the bottom line was sufficient to conclude that had Merck additionally disclosed the multi-billion
dollar impact, the total mix of information available to investors would not have significantly
altered. See In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 1989) ("We conclude
that in a fraud on the market case, the defendant's failure to disclose material information may be
excused where that information has been made credibly available to the market by other sources.
The issue with regard to the bulk of Apple's misstatements is whether, in light of the press'
documentation of Lisa's risks, a rational jury could nonetheless find a 'substantial likelihood' that
full disclosures by Apple would have 'significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made
available."' (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (9th Cir. 1989))).
192. See Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, Company and Case
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a motion to dismiss, the court was required to "accept as true all facts
alleged in the complaint."' 93 Other cases have held that an overstatement of
revenues in violation of GAAP "can constitute a false or misleading
statement of material fact necessary to establish a Section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 violation."'194 Even though Merck stated publicly that its accounting
in the matter was "entirely appropriate because it ha[d] a residual legal
liability" in connection with the co-payments and Medco met "various
'indicators' spelled out in the accounting rules for booking such revenue, ' '9
various financial experts stated that the booking of such uncollected revenue
"overstates total economic activity at the company" and that for "a PBM that
has no legal liability for the co-payment, has no risk for the co-pay and in
fact never ever receives the co-payment, it would not be appropriate under
GAAP . . . to report this revenue."' 96  Regardless, even if Merck was
technically in compliance with GAAP, that does not insulate the company
from liability.' 97  Most likely, the appropriateness of Merck's revenue
recognition practice is a subject on which reasonable minds can differ.98
Information, Merck & Co., Inc., http://securities.stanford.edu/1024/MRK02-01/.
193. Merck, 432 F.3d at 266.
194. Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1305 (C.D. Cal. 1996)
(citing Malone v. Microdyne Corp., 26 F.3d 471, 478 (4th Cir. 1994)); see Sirota v. Solitron
Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566, 572-76 (2d Cir. 1982).
195. Martinez, supra note 174, at CI; see also Martinez, supra note 180, at AI ("Merck contends
that it has legal liabilities for the co-payment under certain circumstances, such as if it transmits
electronically to the pharmacist incorrect information about how much co-payment the pharmacist
should collect. But in its SEC filing, the company said it doesn't face a 'credit risk,' which would
force it to reimburse pharmacies if a customer skipped out on making the co-payment.").
196. Martinez, supra note 174, at Cl (quoting Charles Mulford, director of financial analysis
program, Georgia Institute of Technology, and Lynn Turner, director, Center for Quality Financial
Reporting, Colorado State University); see also Merck-Medco Spinning Off From Parent Amid
Revenue Recognition Controversy; Future Uncertain, DRUG COST MANAGEMENT REPORT, July
2002, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-m0NKV/is-7-3/ai-89237275 ("[S]ome accounting
experts believe that including copayments on the PBMs [sic] statement is misleading, because it
inflates the gross revenue figures for both the PBM subsidiary and it's [sic] parent company.");
Martinez, supra note 180, at Ai ("'For a company such as Merck to reflect as revenues in its
financial statements billions of dollars of co-payments a customer makes directly to another
company, the pharmacy, which the pharmacy collects and never remits to Merck, just does not
reflect the economics of what is occurring,' said Lynn Turner, a former chief accountant at the SEC
who is now an accounting professor and director of the Center for Quality Financial Reporting at
Colorado State University in Fort Collins. 'If that is what the SEC accepts, then investors are in
trouble and our financial reporting indeed needs improving,' he said.").
197. Martinez, supra note 180, at Al ("Medco's accounting practice echoes a recent case
involving Edison Schools Inc., a commercial operator of public schools, which was booking as
revenue funds that school districts paid directly for teacher salaries and other costs. The SEC in May
found that Edison 'failed to disclose that a substantial portion of its reported revenues consist of
payments that never reach Edison.' Although Edison's accounting practice, which didn't affect net
income, conformed to generally accepted accounting principles, the SEC said that 'technical
compliance with GAAP' doesn't insulate a company from enforcement action if it makes filings
'that mischaracterize its business or omit significant information."').
198. See In re Digi Int'l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1098 (D. Minn. 1998) ("Plaintiffs
allege that defendants' use of the note receivable method was not only mistaken, but also clearly
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All this suggests the better result would have been to deny the motion to
dismiss. The Reasonably Available Data rule would have led to that result.
Compare the approach the Third Circuit took in Merck, with that of the
district court in Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharmaceutical
Corp.'99 Marksman involved facts very similar to those in Merck: the court
was ruling on a motion to dismiss a Rule 1Ob-5 claim involving allegations
of revenue inflation via booking consignment sales which were subject to a
right of return.200 The agreement containing the terms of the consignment
deal was disclosed by Defendant as part of its 1995 10-K. 20 1 However, it
was not until a Barron's article revealed the accounting implications of the
agreement that the market reacted negatively. 2  In discussing the claim, the
Marksman court noted that:
Materiality of information in a Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 case is
ordinarily a jury question, requiring an assessment of the inferences
that a reasonable shareholder would draw from a given set of facts.
inappropriate with regard to the AetherWorks investment; defendants respond that the appropriate
method of accounting for the AetherWorks investment was open to interpretation during the class
period. The evidence, in the form of expert testimony or otherwise, ultimately may prove defendants
to be correct, but the Court cannot resolve this issue on a motion to dismiss."); Martinez, supra note
180, at Al ("The benefits to Medco of including co-payments as revenues aren't clear cut. The
accounting treatment, while making Medco's revenue look larger, actually decreases its gross-profit
margins compared with some of its competitors, which is the opposite of what investors generally
like to see. However, some competing pharmacy-benefit managers and customers say that large
revenues and a lower gross margin are more attractive to potential clients, because they indicate that
a company can handle large volumes and that it passes on more of its profits to its customers.").
199. 927 F. Supp. 1297 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
200. See id. at 1301 n.l ("A consignment sale is one in which goods are delivered by a consignor
to a dealer or distributor (the consignee) primarily for sale by the consignee, and the consignee has
the right to return any unsold commercial units of the goods in lieu of payment. Because a product
return cancels the sale, any sale made with the right of return creates doubt about whether the
transaction actually constitutes an exchange.") (internal citations omitted). Cf Malone v. Microdyne
Corp., 26 F.3d 471, 478 (4th Cir. 1994) ("We cannot find a single precedent, however, holding that a
company may violate FAS 48 and substantially overstate its revenues by reporting consignment
transactions as sales without running afoul of Rule lOb-5. The case law clearly states that such a
company may be held liable under § 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 for making false or misleading statements
of material fact."); see also Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566, 572-76 (2d Cir. 1982)
(holding defendants liable for securities fraud because they reported consignment transactions as
sales); Bernstein v. Crazy Eddie, Inc., 702 F.Supp. 962, 970-71 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (stating that it is a
"fraudulent practice[ ]" to treat as sales "[t]ransactions that were really consignments").
201. Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1302 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
202. Id. at 1303 ("On January 6, 1996, Chantal's well-publicized rise came to an abrupt halt. On
that date, the financial journal Barron 's published an article questioning Chantal's accounting and
whether Chantal's reported revenues represented a true sale, since the risk of ownership of the
products did not appear to have transferred from Chantal to Stanson. Two days later, on January 8,
1996, Chantal's stock lost 62% of its value, going from $19.125 to $7.31 per share on a trading
volume in excess of 7,000,000 shares.") (internal citation omitted).
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As such, a complaint may not be properly dismissed pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) on the grounds that the alleged misstatements or
omissions are not material unless they are "so obviously
unimportant to a reasonable investor that reasonable minds could
not differ on the question of their importance. 2 °3
In addressing Defendant's argument that disclosure of the marketing
agreement cured the earlier misrepresentations, the Marksman court agreed
that true statements could cure false ones but stressed that the disclosure of
the truth must be of an "intensity and credibility sufficient to effectively
counterbalance any misleading impression" created by a defendant's earlier
misrepresentation. 20 4 Because "[t]o immunize the type of conduct alleged
here would be to give companies a license to issue groundless appraisals to
investors so long as they include a modest footnote or appendix with a
kernel of truth that might enable an analyst or accountant to spot the
inconsistencies," the court declined to dismiss the action.205
Obviously, there are a number of facts upon which Merck and
Marksman could be distinguished. However, is it at all clear that the Merck
court was justified in essentially foregoing any analysis of the reasonable
availability of the bottom line via calculation simply because it was dealing
with a math case? In certain cases, that may be the correct approach. In
Merck, however, the lack of rigor arguably led to the wrong result. Another
case that may suggest that a more fine-tuned rule is necessary for Simple
Math cases is Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc. 206
In Kramer, Time Incorporated ("Time"), in connection with its planned
merger with Warner Communications, Inc. ("Warner"), "mailed to Warner
shareholders a formal offer to purchase contained in a Schedule 14D-1
(collectively 'Offer to Purchase') filed with the SEC. 207  As part of the
planned merger, certain Warner executives were to gain handsomely under
an incentive plan, which employed a combination of "Equity Units" and
options to compensate the executives.2 °8 Plaintiff claimed the details of this
203. Id. at 1305-06 (quoting Goldman v. Beldon, 754 F.2d 1059, 1067 (2d Cir. 1985)) (internal
citations omitted).
204. Id. at 1306 (quoting In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 1989)).
205. Id. at 1307.
206. 937 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1991).
207. Id. at 770.
208. Id. at 771 ("In 1982, Warner's shareholders approved an Equity Unit Purchase Plan ('Equity
Plan') under which high-level Warner executives could purchase blocks of equity interest in the
company, each block consisting of seventy-five shares of Warner common stock ('Equity Unit').
Payment for Equity Units could be made by cash or promissory note. Under the Equity Plan,
purchasers were obligated eventually to resell their Equity Units to Warner at a resale price roughly
equal to the aggregate book value of the common stock contained in the Units. The Equity Plan
gave the Executive Compensation Committee of Warner's board of directors the discretion to
modify the resale price under certain circumstances. In addition to purchases under the Equity Plan,
Warner's top managers also were issued, at various times, options to purchase shares of Warner
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plan were insufficiently disclosed to inform shareholders of potential
conflicts of interest. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the Offer to
Purchase merely stated the per-share-price at which the executive's Equity
Units would be purchased ($70), but did not mention the then-current resale
price ($5.19), the number of shares held by the executives (700,000), or the
original purchase price ($10.00).209 "These omissions, Kramer asserted,
concealed the magnitude of the profits accruing to the individual defendants
from the adjustment of the resale price in the Equity Plan., 210 "Kramer
argues that had he known that the individual defendants owned Equity Units
representing thousands of shares of Warner stock, the resale price of which
would be adjusted from $5.19 to $70.00 per share, he would have viewed the
Warner directors' recommendation to accept Time's offer differently.
' 211
The Second Circuit recognized that inside director gain in connection
with a recommended transaction constituted material information.212
Additionally, and particularly relevant for purposes of our discussion here,
the court recognized that the magnitude of the gain could also constitute
material information.21 3  Despite this, the court concluded that the
information regarding the magnitude of the inside directors' gain was
properly disclosed. The Offer to Purchase, mailed June 19, 1989, was
arguably deficient, and its generic references to the Joint Proxy Statement
were insufficient to alert shareholders to the relevant material information
contained therein (data allowing a calculation of the directors' gain).
However, a letter mailed by Warner to its shareholders in connection with
the Offer to Purchase included a Schedule 14D-9. The Schedule 14D-9
incorporated by reference the Joint Proxy Statement issued on May 24,
1989, and alerted the shareholders to information therein regarding "certain
contracts, agreements, arrangements or understandings between [Warner]..
. and certain of [its] directors ... [and] executive officers., 214 The Second
Circuit recognized that this crumb-trail of disclosure was "not ideal," but
nonetheless found it sufficient.215  But is this really "full and fair"
disclosure? If you were a Warner shareholder, would you understand the
Securities Regulations to require no more disclosure regarding interested
common stock at various specified prices.").
209. Id.
210. Id. at 772.
211. Id. at 777.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 778.
215. Id.
directors' financial gain from a recommended transaction? 216 Had the court
applied the Reasonably Available Data rule proposed here, it would have
had to ask more questions. Specifically, it would have had to ask whether
the data necessary to calculate the magnitude was: (1) disclosed proximately
to where a reasonable investor would expect to find it (it was not); (2)
reasonably available-particularly whether it was cross-referenced to in
some meaningful way (arguably, it was); and (3) disclosed in such a way as
to highlight its import (seemingly, an open question of fact).
Another case from the Third Circuit that may suggest a need for a more
analytically rigorous rule is Werner.2 17  In that case, management
recommended approval of a buy-out without disclosing the magnitude of the
benefit that would inure to them if they deleted a right of first refusal under a
restricted stock plan.21 5 The court concluded that failure to disclose the
magnitude was an immaterial omission because the information was still
accessible through a six-step process: First, the 1997 proxy disclosed the
planned removal of the right of first refusal.2 19 Second, "a reasonable
shareholder should have realized that management would get a higher price
for their shares by deleting the right of first refusal., 220 Third, shareholders
then "only had to look to the 1993 and 1994 annual reports to determine how
many shares were issued each year pursuant to the Restricted Stock Plan. 2 1
Fourth, "[u]sing those same reports, shareholders could determine the
approximate fair market value ('FMV') of Restricted shares at the date of
issuance.' 222 Fifth, shareholders could then employ the equation "[(FMV
1997 - FMV in 1993) x number of shares issued in 1993] + [(FMV 1997 -
FMV 1994) x number of shares issued in 1994]" in order to "compute the
amount of money the management defendants would have gotten for their
shares had the right of first refusal been exercised., 223  Finally,
"shareholders could then compare the amount yielded by the above equation
to the $66 million the management defendants would actually receive in the
Recapitalization as proposed., 224 Many may conclude that if this six-part
formulation can constitute full and fair disclosure, then the reasonable
216. Cf Robinson v. Penn Cent. Co., 336 F. Supp. 655, 657 ("If that [material information] is in
the present proxy material, it is too well encoded to be meaningful."); id. at 658 ("The facts must be
fully and explicitly disclosed.... Conclusory statements and bare facts without a disclosure of the
key issues involved at arriving in an intelligent decision will not satisfy the requirements of § 14(a),
or S.E.C. Rule 14a-9.").
217. 267 F.3d 288 (3d Cir. 2001).
218. Id. at299.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 299-300.
222. Id. at 300.
223. Id.
224. Id.
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investor may need to consider quitting his or her day job so as to allow
enough time for this game of hide-and-seek with the truth.
225
Nevertheless, the court concluded that because shareholders could
compute the magnitude of the benefit inuring to management via removal of
the right of first refusal, the failure to disclose this magnitude was
immaterial. 6 There was little examination of where or how the data needed
for the calculation was disclosed. Rather, the simple fact that it was
disclosed in some way that was accessible to shareholders was enough for
the court. Again, had the Reasonably Available Data rule been applied, the
motion to dismiss likely would have been denied.
The preceding discussion should not lead the reader to conclude,
however, that the proposed rule would never allow for dismissal where the
data necessary to calculate the bottom line is disclosed in a dispersed
manner. Consider Ash v. LFE Corp.227 There, the issue again was director
interest in a recommended transaction proposed to shareholders, this time
concerning revision of a pension plan.228 The proxy statement set forth the
existing remuneration of the directors in tabular form, including annual
expected retirement benefits. 229 This disclosure included a cross-reference
to the new proposed plan. 230  Following this reference would lead the
shareholder to a disclosure setting forth the annual expected retirement
benefits under the new proposed plan.231  Even though the total gain to
directors was not explicitly disclosed, the court found no violation because
all that was required of the shareholder to determine the gain to the directors
was to perform the "simple arithmetical computation" of subtracting the old
225. An obvious rebuttal here is that it is precisely because individual investors do not have the
time to work their way through the plethora of documents they are inundated with, due to the very
disclosure rules designed to protect them, that a rule like the Reasonably Available Data rule is
impractical. However, as long as the focus of security regulation's materiality analysis is the
reasonable investor, it is no real argument to say "they won't read it." To the extent defendants
should be protected on that ground, reliance provides sufficient cover. Furthermore, it seems fair to
argue that the more explicitly material information is disclosed, the less time it will take that
information to reach the market, thereby reducing the arbitrage opportunities of sophisticated
investors-which will likely be taken at the expense of average investors. Cf STEPHEN J. CHOI &
A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS 180 (Foundation 2005) ("The
Commission adopted Regulation FD to level the playing field for all investors with respect to the
disclosure of material, nonpublic information by issuers .... Prior to Regulation FD, small investors
were often disadvantaged because they did not have equal access to such information at the same
time as large institutional investors and other securities industry professionals.").
226. Werner v. Werner, 267 F.3d 288, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).
227. 525 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1975).
228. Id. at 217.
229. Id. at 218.
230. Id.
231. Id.
benefit from the new. 23 2 Applying the Reasonably Available Data rule to
the facts of this case should produce the same result. While the necessary
data was not disclosed proximately, it was cross-referenced and its import
was readily discernable.233
C. The Corrective Disclosure Cases
Where a defendant is seeking to rely on the Simple Math rule in order to
avoid liability following an affirmative misstatement (as opposed to the
situation where the only alleged misdeed is failure to disclose the bottom
line), that fact should count as a separate factor against the defendant. This
is so because an investor should reasonably be able to expect disclosure of
the magnitude of a correction where that magnitude is material. Not
disclosing the magnitude as part of a corrective disclosure is akin to saying,
for example: "Yes, we violated a technical rule, but the magnitude of the
error is so minor we need not even bother you with it."' 234 The weighing of
this factor against defendants is not new. For example, in United
Paperworkers International Union, the Second Circuit noted that incomplete
disclosure would not have been found to be material if, among other things,
"the Company's misleadingly self-laudatory statements [had] not been
made .... ,,235
In In re Digi International, Inc., plaintiffs claimed Digi International,
Inc. ("Digi"), improperly accounted for certain transactions so as to
artificially inflate earnings.236 Specifically, plaintiffs challenged Digi's use
of the "note receivable" method to account for a particularly risky multi-
million dollar investment (by means of a convertible secured note) in a
development stage company named AetherWorks 37 Plaintiffs argued that
Digi should have used the "equity method" to account for its investment in
AetherWorks.238  Prior to the litigation, in an announcement dated
November 14, 1996, Digi suggested this was correct when it "indicated that
232. Id. at 218-19 ("We decline to hold that those responsible for the preparation of proxy
solicitations must assume that stockholders cannot perform simple subtraction.").
233. Compare id. at 219 (noting that the failure to do the math for shareholders in Ash was
immaterial as matter of law because the data necessary to perform the relevant calculations was
"disclosed prominently and candidly"), with In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261, 270 (3d
Cir. 2005) ("The calculation from Merck's S-I was somewhat more complex-it required some
close reading and an assumption as to the amount of the co-payment.").
234. Cf David Reilly, No More 'Stealth Restating', WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2006, at CI ("By
failing to properly file disclosures related to restatements, companies hope investors 'may dismiss a
restatement as relatively minor,' because it was tucked 'away quietly in the current period's results,'
research firm Glass Lewis & Co. said in a report earlier this year. 'Clearly, companies know this-
and many take advantage,' that report noted.").
235. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Int'l Paper Co., 985 F.2d 1190, 1200 (2d Cir. 1993).
236. In re Digi Int'l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1093 (D. Minn. 1998).
237. Id. at 1093-94.
238. Id. at 1094.
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if it were required to apply the equity method of accounting, Digi's share of
AetherWorks' fourth quarter operating losses would range from $0.15 to
$0.20 per share. 239 In making this announcement, however, "Digi did not
indicate . . .what effect application of the equity method would have on
stated earnings for the first three quarters of fiscal year 1996. "240 Digi's
stock declined only modestly after this announcement.2 4'
On December 23, 1996, Digi disclosed that it would have to restate its
quarterly financial reports for the first three quarters.242 Digi acknowledged
it should have used the equity method to account for its investment in
AetherWorks, and that its actual earnings for 1996 would end up
approximately thirty-seven percent below what had been previously
reported.243 The market reacted strongly to this announcement, with Digi's
stock dropping sharply.
244
In defending against plaintiffs' claims, Digi argued its announcement on
November 14th (that it was considering use of the equity method) cured any
earlier misstatements regarding its accounting.2 45  The court, however,
concluded that "Digi's November 14, 1996 press release did not set forth
with sufficient completeness or clarity the 'bad news' regarding
AetherWorks to cure all of the misperceptions created by Digi's earlier
disclosures. 246 Specifically, Digi's November 14th announcement, among
other things, "did not discuss the potential effect of the change in accounting
treatment on the results of the first three quarters of 1996 .... ,,247 Thus, the
court held that "the November 14 press release was not sufficiently accurate
or complete to cure, as a matter of law, Digi's previous omissions and
misleading financial statements regarding AetherWorks. 248
Digi was decided via implicit application of the truth-on-the-market
doctrine. Some may argue that the truth-on-the-market doctrine provides
sufficient analytical rigor where defendants claim that disclosure of the truth
should cure a prior falsity by placing the burden on defendants to prove that
the truth was disseminated with sufficient intensity and credibility to
"'effectively counterbalance any misleading impression created by insider's
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1102.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
965
[sic] one-sided representations.' ' 249 However, as discussed in more detail
elsewhere in this paper, because the truth-on-the-market doctrine is best seen
as a means for defendants to rebut the fraud-on-the-market presumption, its
applicability to the materiality determinations at issue here should
be limited.
This is not to say that, as also discussed above, disclosure of the truth
cannot be used to demonstrate immateriality under the total mix analysis.
The question then, however, is more fact specific-focusing on the impact
of the disclosure on the reasonable investor. Also, the Reasonably Available
Data rule is arguably better suited to address calculation cases than the truth-
on-the-market doctrine, because its decision-tree analysis is specifically
designed for cases involving mathematical calculations based upon disclosed
data. While it is certainly better to ask whether the data was disclosed with
sufficient credibility and intensity to offset an earlier misleading disclosure
than to simply ask whether it was disclosed, there is still a lot of uncertainty
that remains as to what will constitute sufficient credibility and intensity. In
a sense, the Reasonably Available Data rule defines this phrase in a way
uniquely suited to the analysis of Simple Math cases.
In terms of practical application, when applying the Reasonably
Available Data rule in cases involving corrective disclosures courts should
count the failure to state the bottom line as a separate factor against finding
that the import of the relevant data was sufficiently highlighted. In fact, a
court should be reluctant to grant a motion to dismiss under the Reasonably
Available Data rule in such a situation where the cross-reference to the data
did anything short of stating, in effect, "this is important." Obviously, this is
a further argument suggesting Merck was wrongly decided.25 1
249. Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1492-93 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F.3d
1363, 1369 (9th Cir. 1994)).
250. See Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 161 (2d Cir. 2000) ("At the pleading stage, a
plaintiff satisfies the materiality requirement of Rule 1Ob-5 by alleging a statement or omission that
a reasonable investor would have considered significant in making investment decisions.");
Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1307 n.6 (C.D. Cal. 1996) ("It
is true that a defendant may sometimes be able to rebut the presumption of reliance in a fraud-on-
the-market action under Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 by showing that sophisticated buyers, or
market makers, were not taken in by the misrepresentations at issue .... [However], the market
maker perspective has no bearing on the question of materiality, which is based instead on the
perspective of a reasonable investor.") (internal quotations omitted); Robinson v. Penn. Cent. Co.,
336 F. Supp. 655, 657 (E.D. Penn. 1971) ("It may be that a sophisticated analyst, with knowledge of
the corporate world, would ultimately deduce from the proxy material [the material information].
However, our concern is not the sophisticated analyst, but the reasonable stockholder ... ").
251. To be precise, whether Merck's disclosure of the details of Medco's revenue recognition
practices was a corrective disclosure is more properly regarded as a question of fact, since Merck
maintained the practice was proper. However, at the pleading stage such factual disputes should be
viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs. See In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 F.2d 261,
266 (3d Cir. 2005).
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D. The Delayed Reaction Cases
The fourth group of cases are those where a significant market reaction
follows disclosure of the bottom line, when there was no reaction to an
earlier disclosure of the data sufficient to calculate that bottom line. In those
cases, plaintiffs may be precluded from arguing that the market took time to
digest the data because a court may conclude that such an argument destroys
the basis for (where applicable) plaintiffs' fraud-on-the-market presumptive
reliance.
For example, the Third Circuit in Merck, responding to just such an
argument, concluded that "[plaintiff] is trying to have it both ways: the
market understood all the good things that Merck said about its revenue but
was not smart enough to understand the [revenue] disclosure. 252  I argue,
however, that because the very crux of these cases is that the bottom line
was not disclosed, the failure of the market to "do the math" immediately
should not deprive plaintiffs of the fraud-on-the-market presumption in light
of the policy reasons in favor of the presumption and the type of market
efficiency necessary for the fraud-on-the-market presumption. In fact, once
the issue is properly framed in terms of whether the data was disclosed in
such a manner as to allow it to serve as proxy for disclosure of the bottom
line, the fact that the market reacted negatively to the eventual explicit
disclosure to that bottom line should count in plaintiffs' favor.
2 1 3
The argument in favor of not equating the market's failure to
immediately react to disclosure of data sans bottom line, with failure of the
plaintiff to meet the efficient market requirement of the fraud-on-the-market
presumption has a number of points to support it. First, it must be
remembered that there is a strong policy reason supporting the fraud-on-the-
market presumption.
The first and most important area in which courts use efficiency as a
descriptive concept is the "fraud-on-the-market" theory. This
theory developed out of a problem confronting plaintiffs in Rule
I Ob-5 litigation. Because these plaintiffs were generally investors
holding passive positions, most individuals' losses were likely to be
small. Consequently, no single investor could expect to benefit
252. Id. at 270.
253. See No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. Am. W. Holding Corp.,
320 F.3d 920, 935 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Moreover, although America West's disclosures of the
settlement agreement had no immediate effect on the market price, its stock price dropped 31% on
September 3, 1998 when the full economic effects of the settlement agreement and the ongoing
,maintenance problems were finally disclosed to the market. This reaction, even if slightly delayed,
further supports a finding of materiality.").
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from bringing an action because, in all likelihood, the costs of
litigation would far outweigh any potential recovery. Class action
litigation offered a solution to this problem. By aggregating claims
in a class action, it would be economically viable to pursue Rule
lOb-5 suits that would serve as a private enforcement mechanism.
25 4
The fraud-on-the-market presumption is available to plaintiffs not solely
on the basis of market efficiency. Rather, like all presumptions, it arises
"out of considerations of fairness, public policy, and probability, as well as
judicial economy. 2 '55  This policy underpinning suggests courts should be
hesitant in adding unnecessary requirements on plaintiffs to gain the benefits
of the presumption.
Second, "[a]ccording to the prevailing definition of market efficiency,
an efficient market is one in which market price fully reflects all publicly
available information., 256  It would be an expansion of this definition to
include not only all publicly available information but also all information
possibly calculated therefrom.257 It is arguably in recognition of this fact
that courts, in evaluating defendants' truth-on-the-market defense, ask not
only whether the truth was disclosed, but also whether "the truth in the
market was sufficient to counteract the alleged fraudulent impact of the
statements in question., 258  To argue that the market's failure to react to
disclosure of the data necessary to calculate the bottom line can only mean
the bottom line is either immaterial or the market is inefficient improperly
assumes an answer to the very question the court should be analyzing: Was
the data disclosed in a sufficiently effective manner?
259
254. Nathaniel Carden, Comment, Implications of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 for Judicial Presumptions of Market Efficiency, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 884 (1998); see also
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 242 (1988) ("Requiring proof of individualized reliance from
each member of the proposed plaintiff class effectively would have prevented respondents from
proceeding with a class action, since individual issues then would have overwhelmed the common
ones."); Basic, 485 U.S. at 231 (noting that the private cause of action has become an "essential tool
for enforcement of the 1934 Act's requirements").
255. Basic, 485 U.S. at 245.
256. In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2005).
257. Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J.
FIN. 383, 383 (1970) (setting forth the issue vis-A-vis the semi-strong form of market efficiency as
"whether prices efficiently adjust to other information that is obviously publicly available")
(emphasis added).
258. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 504.
259. United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1298 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Contending there were no
material misstatements or omissions to support his § 10(b) convictions, defendant argues first that
the absence of any market fluctuation in Cluett stock immediately after his 13D was filed
demonstrates that the information was not important to investors.... Turning to defendant's first
point, whether a public company's stock price moves up or down or stays the same after the filing of
a Schedule 13D does not establish the materiality of the statements made, though stock movement is
a factor the jury may consider relevant."); State Teachers Ret. Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 566 F. Supp. 939,
949-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("The 'mosaic' concept, it would seem, is also relevant in considering the
weight to be given to market movement. Certain of the projections were released in due course, and
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Third, at a time when challenges to the efficient market hypothesis can
be found in both the enactments of Congress 260 and among finance
261 eesichrntowae aexperts, it seems incoherent to weaken a presumption that relies on that
hypothesis only to a degree 262 by means of an analysis that leans on it so
thoroughly. To argue that a market is only efficient for purposes of the
fraud-on-the-market presumption if it reacts not only to disclosed
information but also to conclusions based upon adding up the pieces of those
disclosures-no matter how disconnected or obscured-seemingly sets the
efficiency bar higher than necessary. While this may be in fact how efficient
markets operate most of the time, this level of functioning is arguably not
necessary to qualify for the fraud-on-the-market presumption.
Courts have stated that the Supreme Court in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson left
for the lower courts to decide what constitutes an efficient market for
purposes of the fraud-on-the-market presumption. 63  This conclusion,
the defendants have established that release of certain items of information failed to result in any
significant market movement. The defendants urge the conclusion that failure of any item of
information to affect market prices when it was released demonstrates as a matter of law its
immateriality. While the lack of market movement certainly is persuasive evidence of immateriality,
particularly with respect to the items conceded to never have been disclosed, it is not so conclusive
in and of itself as to warrant dismissal of an item which may or may not be a coordinate in the
'matrix.' Lack of market effect alone fails to remove the issue of its materiality as a matter of law
from the jury's consideration .... ").
260. See Carden, supra note 254, at 880 ("In ... the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 ('PSLRA').... Congress enacted a provision that caps the amount plaintiffs can recover in
damages. This limit on damages was in response to the possibility that markets might overreact
when the fraud is disclosed. Thus, the PSLRA indicates a congressional skepticism of the ECMH.");
see also Jeffrey L. Oldham, Comment, Taking "Efficient Markets " Out of the Fraud-on-the-Market
Doctrine After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 995, 998 (2003)
("[T]he PSLRA's damages provision and its underlying policies evidence a rejection of the efficient
market theory as a descriptive theory of the marketplace.").
261. See Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral
Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 135, 136 (2002) ("[F]aith in the EMH among
economists has been weakening for some time. That is not new news; by the mid- I980s, the notion
of market efficiency was already under attack by finance scholars of considerable prominence.
Since then, however, the battle has turned into something akin to a siege. Critics are still increasing
in visibility and numbers and seldom does an edition of one of the best finance journals appear
without at least one or two major papers offering theoretical or empirical claims inconsistent with
strong views of efficiency."); see also id. at 135 ("How was the market for such a widely followed
stock [like Enron] so easily fooled, especially when (in hindsight, at least) warning signs about
obscure accounting, risk-shifting, and self-dealing practices were visible?").
262. See Carden, supra note 254, at 887 ("If the price movement was in the proper direction, it is
sensible to apply the presumption. The theory does not require that the magnitude of such a
response be perfect (as the semi-strong ECMH would predict). Hence, while the existence of an
informationally efficient market is a sufficient condition for the fraud-on-the-market theory to make
sense (because all the information is not only incorporated, but is incorporated to such a degree that
further research is futile), it is not a necessary one.").
263. In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2005).
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however, does not flow automatically from the Basic opinion. A better
reading of that case may be that, while the Court left certain questions
regarding market efficiency unanswered, it clearly identified the minimum
threshold necessary for a plaintiff to gain the benefits of the fraud-on-the-
market presumption.2 64 In other words, so long as "most" publicly available
information about a company is "generally" considered by market
professionals, stock prices can be presumed to be sufficiently impacted by
such information to warrant application of the fraud-on-on-the-market
presumption. 65  Following this logic, when lower courts subsequently
require more, they violate the Court's edict.266  Thus, the Third Circuit
arguably set the bar too high when it concluded that failure of the market to
react to disclosure of data-sans-impact by Merck could only mean that either
the revenue recognition practice was immaterial or the market was
inefficient. Given the degree of market coverage Merck receives and the
multi-billion dollar impact of the disclosure, a third alternative-that the
information regarding the revenue recognition practice and its impact were
insufficiently disclosed to judge its materiality on the basis of market
reaction-should at least have been considered.2 67  As the Supreme Court
264. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246-47 n.24 (1988) ("We need not determine by
adjudication what economists and social scientists have debated through the use of sophisticated
statistical analysis and the application of economic theory. For purposes of accepting the
presumption of reliance in this case, we need only believe that market professionals generally
consider most publicly announced material statements about companies, thereby affecting stock
market prices.") (emphasis added); id. at 247 ("Because most publicly available information is
reflected in market price, an investor's reliance on any public material misrepresentations, therefore,
may be presumed for purposes of a Rule lOb-5 action.") (emphasis added); id. at 248 n.28 ("By
accepting this rebuttable presumption, we do not intend conclusively to adopt any particular theory
of how quickly and completely publicly available information is reflected in market price.").
265. Id. at 247 n.24. But see PolyMedica, 432 F.3d at 10 (expressly rejecting such a definition in
favor of one that defines an efficient market for purposes of the fraud-on-the-market presumption as
"one in which the market price [of the stock] fully reflects all publicly available information")
(emphasis added). Cf Note, Recent Cases: Securities Law-Fraud-on-the-Market-First Circuit
Defines an Efficient Market for Fraud-on-the-Market Purposes, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2284, 2284-85
(2006) ("While purporting to adopt a widely accepted definition of market efficiency, the
PolyMedica court has imposed a more stringent test for market efficiency than has heretofore been
employed by courts--one that forces lower courts to determine whether a real-world market
conforms at the margins to a definition of efficiency adopted from efficient capital markets
scholarship and that loses sight of the goals of Basic.").
266. Cf No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. Am. W. Holding Corp.,
320 F.3d 920, 946 (9th Cir. 2003) ("In this era of corporate scandal, when insiders manipulate the
market with the complicity of lawyers and accountants, we are cautious not to raise the bar of the
PSLRA any higher than that which is required under its mandates.").
267. Cf Basic, 485 U.S. at 249 n.29 ("We note there may be a certain incongruity between the
assumption that Basic shares are traded on a well-developed, efficient, and information-hungry
market, and the allegation that such a market could remain misinformed, and its valuation of Basic
shares depressed, for 14 months, on the basis of the three public statements. [However, pIroof of
that sort is a matter for trial .... "). Compare In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261, 270-71
(3d Cir. 2005) (suggesting that a company as widely followed in the market as Merck could be
deemed to be trading in an inefficient market solely on the basis of the market's failure to
immediately calculate the impact of a disclosed revenue practice) with Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F.
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stated in the context of Rule 14a-9 in TSC Industries, "[d]oubts as to the
critical nature of information misstated or omitted will be commonplace. 268
In view of the "prophylactic purpose" of the antifraud provisions and the
fact that the content of the corporate disclosure is within management's
control, it is appropriate that doubts "be resolved in favor of those the statute
is designed to protect."
269
Finally, if one properly frames the issue as whether the relevant data
was disclosed effectively enough to warrant treating it as disclosure of the
bottom line, a negative market reaction to the later actual disclosure of that
bottom line suggests the answer is "no." For example, in Ganino v. Citizens
Utilities Companies, the Second Circuit was faced with a form of delayed
market reaction.27° In that case, Citizens Utilities Companies ("Citizens")
allegedly misrepresented earnings growth by improperly accounting for
revenue received in 1995 as part of its 1996 revenue.271 Citizens, however,
claimed that the date of revenue receipt had been properly disclosed as early
as April 1996.272 Furthermore, Citizens claimed the lack of a market
reaction following the release of its 10-Q on August 7, 1997, wherein the
company disclosed the source of the contested 1996 revenue, proved the
Supp. 1264, 1286-87 (D.N.J. 1989) (setting forth a multi-factor test of market efficiency, including:
(1) average weekly trading volume; (2) number of securities analysts following stock; (3) number of
market makers; (4) eligibility to use Form S-3; and (5) a cause and effect relationship between
significant disclosures and immediate response in stock price).
268. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,448 (7th Cir. 1976).
269. Id.; see also Cione v. Gorr, 843 F. Supp. 1199, 1205 (N.D. Ohio 1994) ("The 1934 Act was
intended to protect investors against unfair manipulation of stock market prices.") (citing S. REP.
No. 792, 73 Cong., 2d Sess., 1-5 (1934)). Cf 4 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEwIs D. LOWENFELS,
BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD, § 7:484 (2d ed. 2001) ("It is relatively inefficient
and imprecise--at trial, but even more so at class determination time--to analyze by regression
analysis or other statistical techniques the response of a given security to specific information about
it in order to decide if its market is efficient. There are questions about what information to test for,
e.g., analysts' opinions or advisers' or brokers' recommendations versus issuer's announcements.
One must somehow factor out general economic, industry and market information not specific to the
security. There may be uncertainty when the information began to reach the market (e.g., by leaks,
rumors or insider trading), creating doubt about the timing and amount of the response.... It is more
reasonable to approximate efficiency by looking at the more easily identifiable or measurable
characteristics that indicate the market is developed. Identifiable characteristics include the structure
and communication systems of the primary market for the security: stock exchange, NASDAQ
National Market System, non-NMS NASDAQ or residual over the counter. Measurable
characteristics for the particular security include number of market makers (if traded off a stock
exchange), number of trades, number of shares or units traded, turnover (proportion of outstanding
shares or units traded in a given time), size of float, number of shareholders and number of
institutional holders.").
270. 228 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2000).
271. Id. at 158.
272. Id. at 168.
information itself was immaterial.273 Plaintiffs, however, noted "that
Citizens' stock price ... experience[d] a 'precipitous drop' in May of 1997,
when reports of Citizens' poor earnings outlook first emerged., 274  The
Second Circuit, noting that on a motion to dismiss all reasonable inferences
must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party, concluded that the source
of the stock price movement was in dispute and that it was at least possible
that the misrepresentation could have caused the May stock price decline.275
Similarly, the court in the Digi case cited above viewed delayed market
reaction as a factor in favor of plaintiffs. There, the market did not respond
to Digi's announcement that it was " revisiting the accounting treatment of
the AetherWorks investment and indicated that it was no longer reasonable
for investors to rely on previous statements regarding Digi's financial
results. 276  However, rather than concluding from this fact that the
particular accounting practice in question was therefore immaterial (as the
Third Circuit did in Merck), the court instead asked whether that disclosure
271was sufficient to "cure" the earlier accounting pronouncements.  Since a
later announcement disclosing the impact of the resulting accounting change
caused the stock to drop sharply, the court answered that question in the
negative: "[T]he substantial drop in Digi's stock value after the December
23, 1996 announcement supports the conclusion that misperceptions in the
market regarding AetherWorks and Digi were not cured until that
later disclosure. 278
Thus, where a company discloses a particular fact along with the data
necessary to calculate the bottom line impact of that fact (but not the bottom
line itself), a later market reaction to disclosure of that bottom line should
help, not hinder, a plaintiff's argument that a material omission
has occurred.
273. Id. at 166.
274. Id. at 167.
275. Id. (citing Silver v. H & R Block, Inc., 105 F.3d 394, 397 (8th Cir. 1997) ("[D]eclining, on a
summary judgment motion, to infer that allegedly material statements were false 'from the
movement of stock price alone.., given the abundance of market variables')); see also id. at 167-
68 ("Here, the defendants argue that the alleged inflation of 1996 income using the 1995 Fees was
immaterial because Citizens' disclosures before Class Period had already transmitted all relevant
information about the HTCC deal to the market. But as explained above, the evidence on which
they rely-the lack of movement in the Citizens share price after August 1997-is in dispute.").
276. In re Digi Int'l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1102 (D. Minn. 1998).
277. Id.
278. Id.; see also No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. Am. W.
Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 320 F. 3d 920, 935 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Moreover, although America West's
disclosures of the settlement agreement had no immediate effect on the market price, its stock price
dropped 31% on September 3, 1998 when the full economic effects of the settlement agreement and
the ongoing maintenance problems were finally disclosed to the market. This reaction, even if
slightly delayed, further supports a finding of materiality.").
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V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I argue that where a securities fraud claim is based on
failure to disclose the bottom line, courts should not dismiss the case solely
on the ground that the data necessary to calculate the bottom line was
disclosed. Rather, relying on general materiality analysis doctrine, I argue
courts should ask: (1) Were all the relevant pieces of data necessary to
calculate the bottom line disclosed proximately to one another in a place
where a reasonable investor would expect to find them? If so, the court
should stop its analysis and dismiss the case. However, if the data is not
sufficiently proximate, the court should go on to ask: (2) Was the data
somehow cross-referenced to? If the court concludes the data was not
reasonably cross-referenced, the motion to dismiss should be denied. If the
data was reasonably cross-referenced to, then the question becomes: (3) Was
the import of the data sufficiently highlighted to alert the reasonable
investor? Again, if the import of the data was not sufficiently highlighted,
the court should deny the motion to dismiss. In addition, where the bottom
line was omitted in a corrective disclosure, that fact should count against
defendants. And, finally, a presumption of materiality should be applied
where the bottom line is subsequently made public and the market reacts
negatively to that disclosure. This approach is more in line with general
materiality analysis and will better serve the interests of full and fair
disclosure than the current approach, which asks only whether the data
necessary to calculate the bottom line was disclosed.
In Merck, the Third Circuit upheld a disclosure that required investors to
"read[] between the lines ' 279 to discover that Merck's main subsidiary had
counted $5.54 billion in revenue that it never actually received.280 Many
would agree that such disclosure is neither full nor fair. The Reasonably
Available Data rule proposed here would help ensure courts take a more
analytically rigorous approach in deciding whether such omissions are
immaterial as a matter of law.
279. In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261, 263 (2005).
280. Id. at 265.
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